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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
The Effects of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Climate on Moral Reasoning 
by 
Marita Louise Mahoney 
Master of Arts, Graduate Program in Psychology 
Loma Linda University, June 2003 
Dr. Kelly R. Morton, Chairperson 
As healthcare professionals, psychology students and psychologists are expected 
to behave ethically and morally. It is assumed that moral and ethical reasoning in 
psychology students develops through exposure to ethical dilemmas within ethics classes 
and during clinical training experiences. Rest's Four Component Model of Moral 
Behavior, a neo-Kohlbergian approach to understanding moral development, posits an 
interaction of Moral Sensitivity, Moral Motivation, Moral Reasoning and Moral 
Character. Moral sensitivity, or awareness of a moral dilemma, is posited to cue the 
moral reasoning process, though little is known about how the training environment can 
facilitate or hamper such developments. Fifty".'two psychology-graduate students were 
assessed on moral sensitivity (empathy) and moral reasoning to determine the impact of 
the moral climate in clinical supervision. The hypothesis that moral climate, students' 
perception of a clinical supervision experience, would either mediate or moderate the 
moral sensitivity and moral reasoning relationship was tested with SEM and hierarchical 
regression analyses. Moral climate moderated the cognitive empathy and moral 
reasoning relationship; however, moral climate neither mediated nor moderated the 
affective empathy and moral reasoning relationship. Affective empathy alone is sufficient 
to cue the moral reasoning process with moral climate having an additional impact on 
x 
moral reasoning. Cognitive empathy interacts with the moral climate to cue the moral 
reasoning process. Mature perspective taking skills within a dearly defined clinical 
relationship experience facilitate the ability to identify and resolve moral dilemmas in 
interpersonal situations such as psychotherapy. 
Xl 
Introduction 
A professional code of ethics is adopted to provide guidelines for resolving ethical 
and moral dilemmas within that profession's context. In the helping professions, a code 
of ethics typically outlines behaviors that are in the best interest of the client or patient. 
Specifically, the goal of The Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct is 
to protect clients within clinical and research settings (American Psychological 
Association, 1992; 2002; American Psychological Association Ethics Committee, 
200lb). However, recent reports of the American Psychological Association (APA) 
Ethics Committee indicate that psychologists are not consistently following their 
professional code of ethics (2000; 2001b; 2002). Traditionally, such a professional ethics 
code is adopted so that the members of the profession are able to monitor themselves 
rather than being regulated by an outside governing agency. 
In 1999 and 2000, the APA included 88 11500 full members and in 2001 89,100 full 
members (AP A Ethics Committee, 2000; 2001 b; 2002). Table 1 presents a summary of 
the most recent findings of the APA Ethics Committee (2000; 200lb; 2002), while Table 
2 summarizes reasons for membership termination (AP A Ethics Committee, 2000; 2001; 
2002). These data indicate that despite continued awareness and education, some AP A 
members violate the ethical code of conduct. It is interesting to note that one of the most 
clearly prohibited behaviors, sexual misconduct, is still violated. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Recent AP A Ethics Committee Rep_orts 
Year 1999 2000 2001 
Membership Total 88 500 88 500 89100 
Violations 
Verbal Inquires 308 252 240 
Written Complaints 70 90 78 
Cases Opened 43 43 42 
Membership Termination 28 35 17 
Felony Conviction 11.9% 4.9% 5% 
Loss of Licensure 57.1% 58.1% 24% 
Adult Sexual Misconduct 2.4% 2.3% 12% 
Non-sexual Dual Relationship 4.8% 2.3% 10% 
Sexual Harassment 0% 2.3% 0% 
Child Custody Assessment 9.5% 11.6% 21% 
Outside Competence 2.4% 0% 0% 
Insurance/fee problems 2.4% 0% 0% 
Inappropriate Professional Relations 0% 2.3% 0% 
Improper Research Techniques 2.4% 0% 0% 
Plagiarism 0% 2.3% 2% 
Other 7.2% 6.9% 2% 
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Table 2 
Reasons for AP A Membershif!. Termination 
Primary category for membership tennination 1999 2000 2001 
Sexual misconduct, adult 17 (60.7%) 14 (40%) 8 (47.1%) 
Sexual misconduct, minor 1 (3.57%) 2 (5.71%) 0 
Nonsexual dual relationship 2 (7.14%) 9 (25.71%) 0 
Insur~ce/fee problems 3 (10.71%) 7 (20%) 0 
Non ... cooperation 0 0 3 (17.65%) 
Other 5 (17.86%) 3 (8.57%) 6 (35.3%) 
Total 28 35 17 
In 1999-2000, the California Board of Psychology received 528 complaints, 
opened 139 investigations and sent 46 cases to the District Attorney or Attorney 
General's office (California Board of Psychology, 2001). Thirty-three decisions 
regarding violations during this time-period included sixteen (48.5%) for gross 
negligence/incompetence, five (15.2%) for conviction of a crime, three (9.1 % ) for 
dishonesty/fraud, three (9.1%) for discipline by another state board, two (6.1%) for 
sexual misconduct, one (3%) for repeated negligent acts, one (3%) for mental illness, one 
(3%) for general unprofessional conduct, and one (3%) for probation violation. Although 
a member of AP A may have their AP A membership tenninated it does not automatically 
follow that they will lose their license, which is issued by the state. Additionally, a 
practicing psychologist does not need to be a member of AP A to be licensed. Although 
licenses are based on laws not the ethics code, the licensing law does incorporate as 
standard of care the AP A ethics code. Therefore, it is important to recognize that ethical 
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violations may be in reference to a national code of ethics and/or to a state level code of 
ethics; however, any ethical violatio~ either at a national code level or a state code level, 
may result in harm to the client. 
At both the national and state levels, psychologists do not simply base their 
decisions on their professional code of ethics. Their professional behavioral choices are 
based on personal values and moral systems that may lead them to commit a variety of 
ethical violations ranging from poor decisions made during subtle day-to-day practices 
regarding confidentiality or boundary violations to clear examples of ethical violations 
like a sexual relationship with a client. Principle B of the APA Ethics Code (1992; 2002) 
encourages psychologists to be aware of their own values and belief systems and how 
these impact their practice of psychology. Higher levels of moral development may 
encourage a moral decision making process that protects psychologists from committing 
ethical violations. 
Moral Development: A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach 
Historically, moral development has been viewed as a sequential stage 
progression. Kohlberg posited that moral development consisted of six stages, ranging 
from lower to advanced critical thinking skills, that cognitive disequilibrium provided the 
motivation to move to the next stage; and, that it was not possible prior to the fourth stage 
to revert to a lower stage of reasoning (Rest, 1994). That is, prior to stage four, moral 
reasoning development only improved. Kohlberg viewed age and experience as primary 
factors in determining moral reasoning stage level and hypothesized that a stage is a 
cognitive structure that determines consistency in thinking. An underlying assumption is 
that a person will act in congruence with their moral reasoning level. This assumption 
has not been consistently supported. 
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Clarifying that Kohlberg never clearly adhered to a simple stage model, in a two-
year longitudinal study, Walker and Taylor (1991) reported that individuals can 
demonstrate moral reasoning representing two or more stage levels and that regression in 
reasoning is possible. The study included child and adult subjects who were assessed as 
reasoning within the first four stages of Kohl berg's level. Regression was seen during 
each stage for both adults and children. The authors suggest the results support a 
consolidation-transition model of moral reasoning, instead of a sequential cognitive 
developmental model Wark and Krebs (2000) also found little within person 
consistency in moral orientation (care versus justice). It appeared that moral reasoning 
was based on moral schema activation. A consolidation-transition model posits that 
development does not progress at a constant rate, but rather cycles through periods of 
-consolidation of new information within a stage along with gradual transition to the next 
stage as a result of cognitive disequilibrium. A consolidation-transition model is similar 
to Kohlberg' s original thesis that cognitive disequilibrium promotes movement across 
stages. The findings support a cyclical pattern of consolidation of new information 
within stage and transition between stages being brought about over time by cognitive 
disequilibrium. 
The neo-Kohlbergian approach, introduced by Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 
(1999) and Narvaez (2001) posits that moral development is based on how individuals 
organize information within their moral schemas. A schema is a set of cognitive 
principles or beliefs that the individual uses to organize, understand, and evaluate 
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infonnation. An event or situation must elicit a moral schema for the individual to 
recognize that a moral dilemma exists. The authors asserted that schemas develop from, 
''preconventionality, conventionality, and postconventionality to depict a logical 
sequence from simple to complex" (Narvaez, et al., 1999, p. 138). Preconventionality is 
concerned with personal interest, conventionality is concerned with maintaining norms, 
and postconventionality is concerned with creating norms and moral schemas that lead to 
societal benefit and cooperation. Schemas develop and gradually change over time, 
leading to increasingly advanced thinking skills. Schemas consist of implicit and tacit 
knowledge used to interpret and judge dilemmas. Individuals with more advanced 
schemas display higher moral sensitivity and moral reasoning (Rest et al, 1999). 
In cross-sectional and longitudinal samples, Thoma and Rest (1999) found 
individual and situational differences in utilization of cognitive skills associated with 
moral stage development. That is, the cognitive skills believed to be associated with a 
stage of moral development are not consistently applied in all situations. Similar to 
Walker and Taylor (1991), Thoma and Rest found that individuals cycle through periods 
of transition and consolidation, both within and across stages of moral reasoning. The 
level of development of an individual's moral schema influences the processes of 
consolidation and transition. Therefore, moral stage advancement does not occur in a 
strict step-wise manner. During the consolidation phase (within stage), the individual is 
most likely to consistently rely on the current stage or lower when engaging in moral 
reasoning. Through the process of consolidation, the individual works toward becoming 
proficient in using the moral reasoning skills associated with that stage. During the 
transition phase (stage advancement), the individual is less likely to rely on one stage of 
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moral reasoning, instead they employ a mixture of reasoning skills that they have already 
attained as well as those they are attempting to incorporate at the next higher level of 
cognitive reasoning. An individual most likely experiences confusion and uncertainty in 
reasoning and actions during transition phases. During transition phases, consistency and 
predictability of moral behavior decreases. Thus, the strength of the link between moral 
reasoning and action varies with the process of consolidation and transition, being 
stronger during times of consolidation and weaker during times of transition. 
Thus, moral reasoning skills, which are determined by moral schemas, develop 
through a process of consolidation and transition. Despite advancement to higher moral 
schemas and reasoning skills, the schemas of less developed moral reasoning do remain 
accessible, and may be activated or acted on in various situations. The ability of moral 
reasoning to predict moral behavior is moderated by the phases of consolidation and 
transition. This moderated effect is the strength in match between the activation of one's 
moral schema levet as indicated by rankings of importance of decision making options, 
and the ratings of importance of decision making options, which is measured by the 
Utilizer or U score on the Defining Issues Test (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; 
Thoma & Rest, 1999; Thoma, Rest, & Davison, 1991 ). During phases of consolidation a 
moral schema develops and strengthens. During consolidation individuals adequately 
understand and interpret new information that fits within the parameters of their current 
moral schema. A transition phase occurs when a current moral schema is inadequate to 
understand or interpret new information, leading to a feeling of conflict and 
disequilibrium that encourages the individual to challenge and question their current 
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moral schema, eventually leading to the development of a new and more advanced moral 
schema. 
Moral Reasoning and the Role of Emotions 
The moderating effect of the processes of transition and consolidation alone do 
not adequately address prediction of moral behavior from moral reasoning. Alldredge, 
Derryberry, Crowson, and Iran-Nejad (2000), Blasi (1980), Thoma (2000) and Pizarro's 
(2000) reviews suggest that the psychological study of morality has historically been 
divided into two perspectives. The traditional perspective encompasses the assumption 
that moral reasoning alone is both necessary and adequate for the production of moral 
behavior. More recently, psychological research has implied the importance of both 
emotions and moral reasoning in the production of moral behavior, with an emphasis on 
the role of empathy (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Lovell, 1999; Nunn & Hazier, 
1990; Pizarro, 2000; Yardley, 1999). 
In a critical review, Blasi (1980) summarized that moral reasoning is based on 
cognitive factors while moral behavior is determined by social factors. While the overall 
findings support the cognitive development perspective, he notes the limitations of 
traditional cognitive developmental theory for focusing on moral reasoning while 
ignoring the importance of moral values. He recommends a process approach such that, 
in addition to cognition, one also incorporates identity, self-regulation, and self .. 
awareness as a means to increase the consistency between moral reasoning level and 
moral behavior (Blasi, 1980, 1994). 
Alldredge et al., (2000) propose a biofunctional model of moral development that 
incorporates both implicit and explicit learning. Although these authors acknowledge 
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that moral development is influenced by both internal and external information sources, 
they posit that moral development occurs based on the brain's ability to adaptively 
incorporate the information that led to cognitive disequilibrium. In this view, schema 
development is seen as occurring at both the cognitive and biological level. Similarly, 
Zigler (1999) advocates that moral reasoning and moral behavior need to be examined in 
the context of emotions and the physiological patterns that accompany moral schema 
development. This position is further expanded on by Damasio's (1994) findings that 
decision making is enhanced when emotions are properly self-regulated. He 
hypothesized that impairments in reasoning are due to a lack of emotional input and 
awareness. 
In the traditional cognitive developmental model of moral development, emotions 
such as empathy, sympathy, guilt, or shame would not be necessary (or adequate) to 
activate a moral schema. Pizarro (2000) questions and challenges the assumption of the 
cognitive model of moral reasoning which states, "that emotions can never aid, and 
always harm moral judgments," (p. 358). Similar to Damasio (1994), Pizarro posits that 
emotions alert us to potential moral dilemmas and quickly and effectively focus our 
attention and limited cognitive resources to aid in the decision making process. Thus, a 
feedback loop exists between emotions and cognitions, allowing moral schemas to 
incorporate congruent information, while incongruent information creates a sense of 
disequilibrium that encourages moral reasoning advancement. Higher levels of moral 
reasoning, especially at the postconventional level, require the ability to empathize with 
others while putting the greater good of society ahead of individual needs. According to 
Pizarro, the congruence between moral reasoning and moral behavior increases when 
emotions, specifically empathy, are taken into account, adding that empathy is a 
motivator for pro-social behavior. 
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Hoffman (2000) agrees that traditional cognitive-developmental theory has 
ignored affect. He emphasizes the role of empathy in the moral reasoning process, and 
states that moral schemas are activated by empathy and thereby influence moral 
reasoning. As he describes empathy as a prosocial motive, Hoffman sees empathy as a 
positive contributor to moral reasoning. He does caution that empathic over-arousal may 
increase one's level of personal distress to a point where an individual becomes unable or 
unwilling to help others. However, failure to have an empathic response to a moral 
dilemma will consistently result in failure to activate moral schema {Hoffman, 2000~ 
Pizarro, 2000). 
In research studies, empathy has been defined as one's emotional or physical 
arousal or distress to the distress expressed or experienced b another (Eisenberg, 2000; 
Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000). That is, an empathic response is a response to the life 
circumstances of another and not one's own circumstance. Empathic responses are 
heightened in situations in which one believes that they are similar to the person 
experiencing distress, attributes blame for the distress to a person other than the person 
experiencing distress, and when one is able to perspective take and understand the 
distress that another is experiencing (Pizarro, 2000). Recently, a distinction has been 
made between an affective empathic response and a cognitive empathic response. 
Affective empathy represents a vicarious response and emotional arousal to another's 
distress, whereas cognitive empathy, which includes perspective taking, is the 
understanding of another's distress (Brems, 1988; Davis, 1983; Davis & Oathout, 1987; 
Lovell, 1999; Morton, Worthley, Nitch, Lamberton, Loo & Testerman, 2000; Pizarro, 
2000). The distinctions between cognitive and affective empathy, although difficult to 
separate (Pizarro, 2000), may be useful in understanding why moral behavior does not 
always follow from moral reasoning. 
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Eisenberg (2000), Hoffman (2000), Pizarro (2000), and Walker (2002) agree that 
empathy is a catalyst to the moral reasoning process. Both affective and cognitive 
empathic responses have the potential to alert one to the existence of a moral dilemma. 
That is, an empathic response may activate ones' moral schema so that the moral 
reasoning process is initiated. However, as cautioned by Eisenberg (2000), Hoffman 
(2000) and Pizarro (2000) an inadequate empathic response (either over-arousal or under-
arousal) may hinder the moral reasoning process, thus stressing the importance of 
effectively regulating our empathic response. 
Thoma (2000) posits that the traditional theory of cognitive moral development is 
singular and conceptually problematic, as moral reasoning alone is a poor predictor of 
moral behavior. That is, other processes must act in conjunction with moral reasoning to 
result in moral behavior. Using empirical findings, Thoma proposes that emotions, 
situational characteristics and personality characteristics interact with cognitions to 
determine moral action, and that consideration of each of these components is necessary 
in any model of moral development that has as the ultimate goal predicting moral 
behavior. Thoma cites Rest"s Four Component Model of Moral Behavior as 
encompassing these facets that have been empirically linked to moral behavior, although 
others have criticized both the neo-Kohlbergian approach and the Four Component model 
for an explicit focus on cognition (Walker, 2002). 
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Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior 
The process of consolidation and transition may be one of the reasons why low 
correlations have been found between moral reasoning level and moral behavior. 
Additionally, reliance on the traditional perspective of cognitive models of moral 
development may also account for the incongruence between moral reasoning level and 
moral behavior predictions. Rest (1994) noted that typically the study of morality has 
been divided between the major schools of psychological theory, with behaviorists 
studying behavior, cognitivists studying cognition and psychoanalysts studying affect and 
personality. Rest hypothesizes that by not considering each of these facets 
simultaneously researchers cannot accurately examine morality. In response, Rest (1994) 
proposed an interactive Four Component Model of Moral Behavior. The components 
are: (1) Moral Sensitivity- awareness of the situation as involving a moral dilemma, 
perspective taking and awareness of cause and effect outcomes for all involved; (2) 
Moral Reasoning- judging which action is most moral or right~ (3) Moral Motivation -
commitment to prioritizing moral values and moral action above other values; and ( 4) 
Moral Character - ego strength and moral commitment that allow persistence in moral 
action. Although Rest refers to his model as non-sequential and interactive, without 
moral sensitivity, that is, without awareness that a moral dilemma exists, one does not 
need to engage in a moral reasoning process. Rest describes the interaction of these four 
components as the determinants of moral behavior. This model incorporates cognitive, 
affective and personality skill development that lead to moral behavior choices. As Rest 
( 1994) hypothesizes, adequacy in each of these four components is necessary for moral 
behavior, while a deficit in any one component may result in immoral behavior. Rest 
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(1984), Rest (1994), Rest and Narvaez (1994), and Rest et al., (1999) agree that the four 
components are not sequential, but are interactive involving feed-forward and feed-back 
loops; however, moral sensitivity appears to start the decision-making process (see Figure 
1 ). Rest has recommended studying facets that make up each of the components in 
isolation in an effort to investigate the patterns of how the four components relate to each 
other and to other variables. In the present study facets believed to be part of the make· 
up of the components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning will be examined. 
Specifically, this study will examine the empathy facet, including both affective and 
cognitive empathy, of the moral sensitivity component and the moral reasoning 
development of the moral reasoning component. The components of moral motivation 
and moral character will not be directly investigated in this study. 
Figure 1. Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior. 
Once a moral schema is activated, the feed-forward and feed-back loops during a 
given situation are analogous to the process of consolidation and transition in moral stage 
development and stage advancement. The assumption of the four-component model is 
that these four inner psychological processes facilitate observable moral behavior (Rest et 
al, 1999). However, the present study posits that moral sensitivity is a catalyst to the 
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decision-making process, as depicted in Figure 1. Moral sensitivity, awareness of a 
moral dilemma, which requires the activation of a moral schema, is a likely prerequisite 
to the process of moral deliberation. Without this awareness, moral reasoning does not 
follow and there is no reason for an individual to consider their moral values or priorities. 
Thus, moral sensitivity is a necessary but insufficient component for moral reasoning, 
and moral reasoning is necessary but not sufficient for moral behavior. Research 
continues to support a consolidation and transition/interactional model that includes 
Rest's Four Components of Moral Behavior (McNeel, 1994; Pizarro, 2000; Pratt et al, 
1996; Rest, 1994; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2000; Thoma & Rest, 
1999; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Rest acknowledges that most research on moral 
development has focused on his second component, moral reasoning. Overall, there is 
minimal research on the other three components. In a review of professional education 
and the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, Bebeau (2002) notes that the effect 
of moral climate and professional development on moral reasoning have not been 
adequately studied. 
Bebeau, Rest and Yamoor (1985) and Bebeau (1994), in assessing Rest's Four 
Component Model of Moral Behavior in dental students, found that ethical sensitivity is a 
distinct construct from moral reasoning. Assessment of three of the four components 
(moral sensitivity using the Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test, moral reasoning using the 
Defining Issues Test, and moral motivation using an assessment of an essay on "What it 
means to you to become a professional") indicate that competency in one component 
does not predict competency in the other components. These results may possibly be due 
to the interactive nature of the components such that development within any one 
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component will directly influence the level and quality of moral reasoning. The level of 
development of the moral schema and where the individual is in the phases of 
consolidation and transition influence individuals' confidence in recognizing and making 
moral judgments, but in real-life ambiguous situations, emotions and values interact with 
these cognitive processes to produce moral actions. It does seem that there is support for 
the components of Rest's model, and that moral behavior is a result of the complex 
interaction of these four components. 
The association between moral reasoning and moral behavior is in the 10% to 
15% range (Thoma, 1994 ), supporting the view that moral reasoning skill level is not 
necessarily congruent with real-life moral decision making. Thoma suggests that moral 
reasoning may play a lesser role in moral behaviors than was previously thought. That is, 
like moral sensitivity, moral reasoning is also necessary but not sufficient for moral 
behavior. Thoma, Rest and Davison ( 1991) demonstrate that the strength of association 
between moral reasoning and moral behavior is moderated by the match between one's 
ratings issues to consider when making a moral decision and their rankings of the four 
most important issues to consider in moral decision making. 
Recent research has implicated the importance of considering both cognitive 
processes and emotion and effective emotional regulation in the initiation of the moral 
reasoning process (Alldredge et al, 2000; Blasi, 1980, 1994; Thoma, 2000; Pizarro, 2000; 
Walker, 2002). Specifically, Damasio (1994) and Pizarro (2000) state that self ... emotional 
awareness alerts one to the existence of a potential moral dilemma. That is, emotional 
awareness triggers the moral sensitivity component, and if this activation is strong 
enough one's moral schema is activated to cue the moral reasoning process. 
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Postconventional reasoning skills requires that one is able to empathize with the distress 
that another may be experiencing while being able to prioritize societal values and 
cooperation above the individual's or one's own personal needs. 
We believe that moral sensitivity is a precursor to the moral reasoning process. 
One facet of activating the moral sensitivity component is through emotional awareness 
and perspective taking, specifically empathy. Eisenberg (2000) Hoffman (2000) and 
Pizarro (2000) each emphasize the role of empathy in alerting one to the presence of a 
moral dilemma, in activating moral schemas and as a catalyst to moral reasoning. An 
empathic response induces awareness of the situation as involving a moral dilemma, 
incorporates the ability to perspective take, and activates moral schemas, all of which fall 
into the component of moral sensitivity. 
Empathy is believed to be made up of two components: an affective response to 
another's distress and a cognitive response in the ability to understand another distress 
through perspective taking (Brems, 1988; Davis, 1983; Davis & Oathout, 1987; Lovell, 
1999; Morton, et al., 2000; Pizarro, 2000). In essence, when an affective empathy 
response occurs one is essentially feeling what the person in distress is feeling, while in a 
cognitive empathic response one perceives their level of control in managing the distress 
experienced by another. One's personal reaction to empathy may also influence whether 
or not a moral schema is activated, additionally a dispositional tendency to be empathic 
versus situationally induced empathic responses may lead to differences in moral schema 
activation. Over or under-arousal of an empathic response may interfere with the 
activation of the moral schema and subsequent moral reasoning and action choice 
(Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000 ). If one is too empathic, that is in 
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situations of another's personal distress one assumes the emotions that another is 
experiencing leading to inappropriate emotional arousal in oneself; this purely affective 
response may increase one's own distress level and interfere with their ability to 
effectively engage in the moral reasoning process. Additionally, if one is aware that they 
have a tendency to become over-aroused when others are experiencing personal distress, 
they may work to suppress such a response in an attempt to deal with the situation on a 
purely cognitive level. That is, they will prevent themselves from having an affective 
response, which in turn, may prevent the activation of one's moral schema and the moral 
reasoning process. As a cognitive empathic response also encompasses the individual's 
level of control in managing the distress experienced by another, if the individual 
perceives that they are vulnerable or at risk not to effectively manage the situation, moral 
schema activation may not occur and the moral reasoning process will not be iriitiated. 
Davis (1980, 1983) found support to a multidimensional assessment of empathy that 
incorporates both affective and cognitive aspects of empathy. Despite research findings 
that empathy, specifically affective empathy, is correlated with moral reasoning, 
Eisenberg (2000) reported that perspective taking (cognitive empathy) is negatively 
related to or unrelated to pro-social behavior. This finding stresses the importance of 
examining both affective and cognitive aspects of empathy and how they may 
differentially impact moral reasoning, and to investigate other variables for potential 
mediator or moderator effects. 
The present study, as a facet of moral sensitivity's activation of moral schema and 
the moral reasoning process, will examine the processes of an affective empathy response 
and a cognitive empathy response. An affective empathy response consists of one's own 
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awareness of an empathic response and arousal in themselves in response to external 
triggers or the personal distress of another. An affective empathy response, with 
effective emotional regulation is believed to be necessary to activate moral schemas and 
cue the moral reasoning process. A cognitive empathy response is not awareness of 
one's own emotional response but an understanding of the personal distress another is 
experiencing through perspective taking. Cognitive empathy, awareness of distress in 
another without experiencing such distress oneself, response may not be sufficient to cue 
the moral reasoning process. Training in the helping professions encourages students to 
understand and empathize with clients' distress in a cognitive empathic manner, while 
discouraging an affective empathy response. That is, the therapist is to gain an 
understanding of the client's distress while understanding that any responses they 
experience are due to the clients' distress and not their own personal circumstances. The 
present study will investigate if these two different empathic response styles, as facets of 
moral sensitivity, have a different impact on moral reasoning. Moral climate will also be 
investigated to determine whether it may mediate or moderate the relationship between 
the empathy styles and moral reasoning. The potential to perceive a lack of control in 
understanding or managing the distress experienced by another, or the concern that one 
may have to engage in risk-taking in order to understand or manage the distress 
experienced by another, in a cognitive empathic response may indicate that cognitive 
empathy is mediated by moral climate. 
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Psychology and Professional Ethics 
To be licensed as a psychologist, to be a member of AP A or to conduct research 
with humans or animals trainees, interns, researchers and licensed psychologists agree to 
abide by the AP A Ethics Code. Knowledge of ethical standards and practice is required 
on licensing exams, continuing education credit in ethics is necessary for licensure 
renewal, and since 1979, AP A has required ethics training in its accredited psychology 
programs (Welfel, 1992). Ethics courses, research and clinical supervision, and role 
modeling have been the primary modes for students to learn about ethical practices. 
Ethics codes in many professions, including psychology, were originally developed so 
that a profession could police itself; however, as society becomes more litigious, 
professional ethics codes are considered legal standards (Bebeau, 1994; Kitchener, 1999; 
Koocher, 1994; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998; Williams, 2001), and the APA ethics 
code states that if the, "ethics code establishes a higher standard of conduct than is 
required by law, psychologists must meet the higher ethical standard. If the 
psychologists' ethical responsibilities conflict with law, regulations~ or other governing 
legal authority, psychologists make known their commitment to the ethics code and take 
steps to resolve the conflict in a responsible manner" (AP A Ethics Committee, 2002, p. 
1062). 
Holmes (1996) and Prilleltensky (1989) assert that psychology has not examined 
its values as a discipline, and that psychologists have not been actively encouraged to 
examine their personal morals. Instead, they are encouraged to view psychology as value-
neutral. Principled ethics, such as those outlined in the AP A Code of Ethics are too broad 
to define what it means to be ethical or moral when providing psychological services in 
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psychotherapeutic settings (Jordan & Meara, 1990). Principled ethics focus on the use of 
objective and universal decision making skills, whereas in real-life decision-making, 
variables such as character, personal investment, personal values, stress, lack of 
experience, anxiety, financial need and rationalization all impact on the decision-making 
process (Holmes, 1996; Jordan et al, 1990; Kitchener, 1999; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 
1998; Prilleltensky, 1997; Smith, McGuire, Abbott, & Blau, 1991). The nine core ethical 
principles guiding psychologists; nonmaleficence, respecting autonomy, beneficence, 
being just, being faithful, according dignity, care and compassion, pursuit of excellence 
and accountability (AP A Ethics Committee, 1992 & 2002; Kitchener, 1999; Koocher et 
al, 1998) may not be "practiced unless they are already embedded in the fabric of 
psychologists' characters" (Koocher et al, 1998, p. 5). That is, knowledge of ethical 
principles alone is not sufficient; the principles need to be incorporated into one's identity 
so that facing a moral dilemma activates a moral schema to initiate a moral reasoning 
process. 
Smith, McGuire, Abbott and Blau (1991) assessed clinicians' reasoning to resolve 
ethical dilemmas. A discrepancy was found between what clinicians should do and what 
they would do. In terms of Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, awareness 
of the ethics code and what should be done corresponds with the components of moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning, while the components of moral motivation and moral 
character correspond with reports of what one would actually do. Discrepancies between 
the action dictated by the ethics code and what a clinician reports they actually would do, 
did not hold when the situation was one that explicitly and clearly violated the ethics 
code. In cases of clear ethical violations, clinicians' assessments of what they should do 
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and what they would do were consistent. Similar to Koocher (1998), Smith et al., (1991) 
suggests that the discrepancy between what one should do and what one would do results 
from deficits in integrity and honesty, such discrepancies may indicate that the ethics 
code has not been internalized into one's identity or moral schema. Possible alternative 
explanations for these discrepancies may be that the clinician is experiencing a conflict 
between two or more values espoused by the ethics code, or is experiencing personal 
distress or emotional turmoil which could interfere with decisions about what they would 
do, especially if choices are subtle. 
Sonne ( 1994) suggests that the ambiguity of the AP A Ethics Code does not 
provide clear guidelines in ethical decision making, in gray areas like non-sexual multiple 
relationships, and does not emphasize the importance of moral sensitivity to initiate the 
moral reasoning process. Thus, when the core ethical principles are in conflict with one 
another (i.e.; in situations where one must weigh the care provided to a client against the 
clients' right to autonomy to refuse treatment or in favor of the treatment of their choice), 
the AP A Ethics Code does not provide guidelines regarding which principle supercedes 
the others '(Kitchener, 1999; Koocher et al, 1998). Without clear guidelines of what 
constitutes reasonable behavior, Sonne suggests that moral insensitivity may be 
evidenced in day-to-day decision making. Ethics education assumes that students have 
already established more advanced moral values and beliefs though this is not necessarily 
true and is likely a poor assumption behind the education process (Brockett, Geddes, 
Westmorland, & Salvatori, 1997). Numerous authors (APA Ethics Code, 1992 & 2002; 
Holmes, 1996; Jordan et al., 1990; Kitchener, 1999; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998; 
Prilleltensky, 1989 & 1997; Smith et al., 1991; Sonne, 1994; and Welfel, 1992) 
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recommend psychologists become aware of their own value systems and how these 
systems impact day-to-day decision making. Thus, knowledge of an ethics code alone 
may not adequately develop or activate the moral schema necessary for moral decision-
making. Through experiences in clinical supervision, students can be encouraged to 
become aware of their own values and moral schemas and how these impact their day-to-
day decision making in therapeutic settings. 
Moral Climate;· Psychology Students and the Role o/Clinical Supervision 
In a review of 172 articles, King and Mayhew (2002) found that improvements in 
moral reasoning are associated with higher education in undergraduates, even after 
controlling for the effects of age and entering level of moral reasoning. McNeel (1994) 
reports that in longitudinal and cross-sectional samples of students that the "college 
experience ejfecf' (p. 31) accounts for increases in moral reasoning on the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT) with effect sizes of .92 and .93 respectively. These effect sizes were 
calculated by dividing the change between freshman and senior year by the freshman 
standard deviation. Effect sizes of this magnitude are considered large. Additionally, 
McNeel (1994) reports that for psychology students, the magnitude of change for growth 
of principled reasoning was d = 1.48. Magnitude of change for other subject majors 
were, "nursing (1.47), with English (1.26), all others (1.15), and social work (1.01 )" 
(McNeel, 1994, p. 34). These change scores for each discipline, including psychology, 
are statistically significant. Change was attributed to peer and faculty discussions of 
moral dilemmas, indicating that exposure to the higher moral levels of others fosters 
personal moral development. However, it is unclear if the assessed change represents 
true moral growth that translates into behavior or if the growth reflects tacit knowledge of 
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moral theory without corresponding action change. That is, students may perform better 
on the DIT over time due to exposure to moral theory in the classroom environment; this 
does not necessarily imply behavioral change. However, there has been no evidence that 
students can fake-good; in fact, exposure to moral theory may create the disequilibrium 
necessary for the student to enter the transition phase, which eventually leads to stage 
advancement. McNeel (1994) concludes that moral reasoning development is improved 
by, "dilemma discussion, deliberate psychological education'' (p. 43) and a direct skill 
building approach, including skills of principled reasoning, such as, "skills of logic, role 
taking and justice operations" (McNeel, 1994, p. 41). McNeel found that in a three-and-
a-half month course on principled reasoning, the growth effect size on the DIT was d = 
.65, which falls in the moderate range, although rates of growth were not similar for all 
students. Similar to McNeel's (1994) findings on improving principled reasoning in 
students, Bebeau ( 1994) indicates that role-taking and experiential learning improves 
levels of moral sensitivity in dental students. Therefore, moving beyond didactic-
teaching methods alone may increase the likelihood of activation of moral sensitivity and 
moral schemas in morally ambiguous situations, which are necessary for moral behavior 
to result. However, for a schema to develop and change, the individual must be faced 
with information that is incongruent with or in conflict with their current moral schema 
(Rest et al, 1999 ), and encouraged and supported in their efforts to reason through this 
conflict. Such encouragement and support is offered in a supportive clinical supervision 
experience in which the student works through day-to-day dilemmas they personally 
encounter. 
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The principles and standards outlined in the AP A Ethics Code assume that 
psychologists operate at a postconventional (creating norms) level of moral reasoning. 
One way for individuals to advance to the postconventional level of moral reasoning is 
through exposure to dilemmas, such as those encountered during clinical supervision 
experiences. Moral sensitivity and moral reasoning leading to moral behavior may 
reflect the individual's moral schema at the time the decision is made, and not of ethical 
principles per se unless those principles have been incorporated into one's identity and 
moral schema. It is imperative that moral schema development be internalized into one's 
identity (Thoma & Rest, 1999; Walker & Taylor, 1991), and one method for this to come 
about is through clinical supervision in which the student is provided with a safe 
environment in which to openly discuss and raise any concerns they may be 
experiencing, while also being appropriately made aware of any potential dilemmas that 
they were not initially aware of. 
Sprinthall (1994) states that discussion alone may not foster moral development, 
and advocates role-taking as a method to foster moral development by advancing both 
cognitive reasoning skills (moral schema) and empathic (moral sensitivity) development. 
Thus, Sprinthall agrees that moral behavior is not solely based on moral reasoning. He 
proposes role-taking as a method to address each of Rest's four components, believing 
that actively using and practicing moral sensitivity and moral reasoning skills leads to 
moral behavior. Experiential learning and role-taking, opportunities provided in clinical 
supervision, move beyond the reasoning and motivational components by having students 
actively resolve real-life dilemmas by evoking emotional reactions and awareness of the 
possible moral choices (activating moral sensitivity). To adequately investigate the 
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relationship of moral reasoning and moral behavior, which historically have been poorly 
correlated, attention must be given to components beyond moral reasoning alone. 
Assessment of moral reasoning alone ignores the influence of personal and contextual 
variables, including affect, past experiences, awareness of consequences, perceptions of 
risks, personal investment, and personality traits which are incorporated in the other 
components of Rest's model. 
Professions, such as psychology, continue to rely on ethics courses to instill moral 
values and behaviors, despite findings indicating that traditional didactic ethics classes do 
not lead to moral development (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). For example, Kalichman (1990) 
found that despite awareness of mandatory reporting, 21 % of psychologists refuse to 
report child abuse, a situation that most individuals clearly recognize as unethical. Many 
academic ethics courses continue to focus on "intermediate-level concepts (e.g., notions 
such as informed consent, paternalistic deceptions and privileged confidentiality)" (Rest 
& Narvaez, 1994, p. 221 ). Ethical violations by psychology graduate students who 
previously completed an ethics course included violation of professional boundaries, 
sexual and non-sexual misconduct (20% ), plagiarism or data falsification ( 15% ), breach 
of confidentiality ( 10% ), endangering the welfare of the client ( 10% ), failure to comply 
with policy (10%), lack of competency (9%), dishonesty (8%), and misrepresentation of 
credentials (3%) (Fly, van Bark, Weinman, Kitchener, & Lang, 1997). Ethical violations 
may be the consequence of lack of moral sensitivity to potential ethical dilemmas, despite 
concrete knowledge of a code of ethics. 
Betan and Stanton (1999) report that many psychologists were not initially aware 
of an ethical dilemma when presented in either written or videotaped format. Similar 
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results were found among dental students prior to dental ethical sensitivity training 
(Bebeau, 1994). In a review of ethics education, Welfel (1992) summarized that the 
effectiveness of ethics training in psychology students has not been adequately assessed. 
She found a number of psychology interns did not recognize the presence of an ethical 
dilemma unless prompted to look for one. Additionally, a number of psychology 
students indicate they would not act on their ethical decision indicating that adequate 
moral sensitivity and moral reasoning were not sufficient to result in moral behavior. 
The components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning were found to be 
distinct constructs among dental students (Bebeau, Rest, & Yamoor, 1985). In a cross-
sectional design, junior students scored higher on moral sensitivity than freshmen 
students indicating that moral sensitivity improves with education, age, and/or 
experience. In addition, differences in correlations between moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning were found by year of training. In freshmen, moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning were significantly correlated (r = . 51 ), while for juniors this correlation drops 
to statistical insignificance (r = .24 ). These findings reveal that age and educational 
experience alone are not sufficient for a positive linear relationship between moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning. Additionally, these findings indicate that the possibility 
that the two components may not develop at the same rate, and that the discrepancy 
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning may increase with age and education. The 
authors conclude that this provides support for the distinctiveness of the two components 
of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1989; Bebeau et al, 1985; 
Bebeau et al, 1999). Instead of expecting a linear relationship between the two 
components, the processes of consolidation (changes within stage) and transition 
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(changes across stages) may better explain these findings. An alternative explanation 
may be that one or more variables may be mediating or moderating the relationship 
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. In familiar situations, year of schooling 
accounted for 40% of the variance in moral reasoning, which requires the activation of 
moral sensitivity, while in unfamiliar situations year of schooling accounted for only 5% 
of the variance in moral reasoning, indicating that moral sensitivity was not activated 
(Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). Despite moral sensitivity being heightened in familiar 
situations, moral schema advancement and generalization to unfamiliar and morally 
ambiguous situations did not occur. 
Although ethics education is common to many counseling professions, training in 
research and scientific methods separates psychologists from many other counseling 
professions (Ellis, 1992 ), and this training is conducted via an apprenticeship model. A 
student-mentor relationship can foster ethical learning and behavior. As noted by Welfel 
and Kitchener (1992) there continues to be a focus on principled ethical training 
conducted in a classroom setting, rather than a focus on the ethics or moral issues that 
students encounter on a day-to-day basis in their professional training which can be 
addressed in a supervision or mentor relationship. Vitz (1990) views a moral response as 
more than just moral reasoning; a moral response is rooted in personal and social 
demands. Vitz also emphasizes that moral reasoning includes an affective component 
that is influenced by personal and contextual demands. As pointed out by Smith et al. 
( 1991 ), focusing ethical training solely on situations in which ethical guidelines have 
clearly been violated is only the starting point. The ultimate goal is to improve moral 
sensitivity in situations that are morally ambiguous. That is, one goal of ethics training 
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and clinical supervision is to develop adequate moral schemas so that in a morally 
ambiguous situation schema activation (moral sensitivity- awareness that a moral 
dilemma exists) will initiate the moral reasoning process and lead to moral behavior. As 
Sonne (1994) and Smith et al. (1991) note, it is the morally ambiguous, day-to-day 
situations faced by clinicians in which the failure to activate a moral schema results in a 
failure to act morally. It is in such situations that the role of the clinical supervisor and 
mentor is of utmost importance, as supervision affords the opportunity to address the day-
to-day situations and dilemmas faced by students as they arise. 
The quality of the supervision experience and the students' perceptions of the 
clinical supervision experience directly impact the student-mentor relationship. An open 
and supportive relationship will foster developments in moral sensitivity, moral schema 
and moral reasoning. In such a relationship, the student will be aware of their role and 
the role of the supervisor, have clear expectations regarding the goals of the supervision 
experience, and will be comfortable in raising any concerns or issues that they may 
encounter or be experiencing. If the student and the supervisor have clear roles and 
expectations these delicate and personal interactions can set the stage for open and honest 
discuss of any explicit and/or subtle dilemma or conflict encountered on a day-to-day 
basis by the student. Conversely, closed, authoritarian or hostile supervision 
environments may hamper development of moral sensitivity, moral schema and moral 
reasoning. Bebeau (2002) notes that a moral climate that incorporates a 'hidden 
curriculum,' in which academic and supervision environments do not make known how 
students will be evaluated, what the expectations of students are, and open disagreement 
is discouraged, hampers moral development in professional educational settings. In 
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closed supervision environments, students experience confusion regarding their role and 
the role of their supervisor, expectations and evaluations are not clearly outlined, and the 
student may feel that they are in a position in which they have to agree with their 
supervisor and that they are not permitted to raise any questions or concerns. In such 
environments, students would not be offered the opportunity to discuss moral dilemmas 
or any issues or concerns that they may be experiencing for fear of disagreeing with their 
supervisor or appearing incompetent. Bebeau's (2002) review found that professional 
education alone did not improve moral reasoning unless it also included the opportunity 
for students to openly discuss ethical and moral dilemmas. The student's perception of 
the moral climate provided during their academic and clinical supervision training 
impacts both their development of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Through open 
and supportive academic and supervision experiences students learn the skills necessary 
to become aware of their own values, create norms, and implement moral behavior. 
In contrast to other professional disciplines, including dentistry, nursing, teaching, 
veterinary, medicine, accounting, and journalism (Rest & Narvaez, 1994), psychology 
has not studied of the impact of ethics training and the moral climate within its own 
discipline. Despite the belief that psychologists should act ethically and morally, Welfel 
(1992) found few empirical investigations concerning the impact of ethics training, and 
concluded the available research is inconclusive regarding the influence of ethics training 
on ethical behavior in psychology students. Ethics training in psychology has focused on 
the technical aspects of ethics at the expense of moral sensitivity. That is, students are 
taught to be sensitive to explicit ethical violations, the intermediate-level concepts of 
consent, deception and confidentiality as identified by Rest and Narvaez ( 1994 ). Though 
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it is in .implicit or unfamiliar situations that the risk of immoral or unethical behavior 
increases, students are not encouraged to be sensitive to implicit moral dilemmas; the 
day-to-day issues encountered that are not explicitly addressed by the ethics code 
(Welfel, 1992). It is in such morally ambiguous situations that the function of the 
student-mentor role may be most important. A student-mentor relationship allows for 
discussion of moral issues to be considered within the context and development of the 
student's life (Ruiz & Vallejos, 1999). Direct supervision may facilitate moral schema 
development so that training includes interpreting the ethics code using postconventional 
reasoning skills, including abstract thinking that is required to meet the goal of societal 
cooperation (Holmes, 1996), thereby increasing the chances of ethical and moral action, . 
even in morally ambiguous situations. Supervision, role-taking and experiential learning 
may foster the internalization of ethical values through the process of consolidation to 
facilitate postconventional reasoning. Direct student-mentor relationships allow students 
to challenge their current moral schema, foster more advanced moral schemas, while 
developing the confidence and emotional regulation skills necessary in effective moral 
reasoning (Saami, 1999). Specifically, appropriate management of emotions aids in 
decision making, while attempting to ignore emotions hinders the decision making 
process. In order for these goals of supervision to be met, the student-mentor 
environment must be open. If a student feels vulnerable with their supervisor and are 
uncomfortable stating that they are experiencing distress (i.e.; the 'hidden curriculum'), 
the supervision experience will not meet these goals as the student will not feel safe in 
opening such discussion. ·In such closed environments, the student may attempt to 
suppress any emotional responses they have to moral dilemmas they encounter out of fear 
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of being evaluated negatively by their supervisor. This suppression will eliminate the 
opportunity for discussion, and awareness of potential moral dilemmas may diminish in 
an attempt to over self-regulate. If the student feels safe and supported, they will not 
experience a sense of vulnerability with their supervisor and will be confident that their 
supervisor is available to assist them with any issues or concerns that they raise. Such 
open and free discussion will foster both the student's awareness of potential moral 
dilemmas, while the student learns to effectively regulate both affective and cognitive 
empathic responses to moral dilemmas. 
Plante ( 1995) found that despite psychology students' awareness of the AP A 
Ethics Code, they have little experience applying ethical standards. He suggests that 
academic and clinical training cannot possibly cover all potential dilemmas a student may 
face, and instead chooses to focus on principled ethics. Welfel (1992) reports that in a 
sample of graduate psychology students and licensed psychologists, over half did not 
recognize an ethical dilemma presented in a video tape of a therapist-client interaction, 
and even after prompting, one quarter failed to recognize an ethical dilemma. 
Interactions depicted included situations involving duty to warn and possible sexual 
abuse of a minor, indicating that subject's moral schemas and moral sensitivity were not 
adequately developed to be sensitive to these ethical areas. The failure to activate moral 
sensitivity, specifically feelings of empathy toward the potential victims, interfered with 
the moral reasoning process. In discussion of moral sensitivity, Betan and Stanton (1999) 
include awareness of one's emotions in applying ethics, and add that acting ethically does 
not always feel good. For example, psychology students are less likely to act ethically in 
situations in which they feel anxiety; a situation in which an open supervision 
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environment may directly assist the student to effective regulate their emotional reaction 
in order to initiate the moral reasoning process. Betan and Stanton ( 1999) suggest that 
psychologists are ~t risk to inadequately engage in moral reasoning due to a lack of 
awareness of the role of personal values, affect and contextual demands, such as personal 
investment, awareness of consequences, risk of consequences, etc. Emotional arousal in 
an ethical situation influences the moral reasoning process. If appropriately managed, 
emotions aid in decision making (Damasio, 1994; Pizarro, 2000; Saami, 1999)~ however, 
if not appropriately acknowledged or regulated, emotional arousal may lead to avoidance 
of the moral reasoning process (Betan & Staton, 1999). Betan and Staton (1999) suggest 
that professional development and clinical supervision experiences need to assist students 
in learning to tolerate uncomfortable emotions and to self-regulate emotions, including 
empathy, personal distress and conflict, and ambiguity in decision making. Additionally, 
Holmes (1996) advocates that supervision openly address issues of emotional 
countertransference, in that supervision experiences need to provide a safe and supportive 
forum in which students can discuss their emotional responses to clients, co-workers and 
the clinical environment. Effective supervision can not operate in a vacuum and ignore 
the emotional responses of students. Instead, supervision may be a rich opportunity for 
students to address both their cognitive and affective responses with the aim of engaging 
in moral reasoning and moral action that benefits and not harm the client. 
Housman and Stake (1999) found that despite specific training in sexual ethics 
there was still a knowledge deficit among psychology doctoral students, reporting that 
50% of the students in their sample report having been attracted to a client. Yet, many 
students were unaware that attraction to a client may be frequently experienced, and 
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although attraction itself is not unethical, the students seemed unaware of the impact such 
emotions on their decision making. The authors stress the importance of supervision, 
discussion and experiential learning in resolving moral dilemmas; however, they indicate 
that many supervision environments are not supportive of a student addressing such 
emotions as attraction to a client. That is, students may not be actively encouraged to 
openly address issues of emotional transference, especially if they perceive that they will 
be negatively evaluated for such or are fearful (i.e., the 'hidden curriculum') that in 
raising such concerns they will be seen as incompetent or unprofessional. Such a closed 
environment does not foster moral sensitivity. Without an open supervision environment, 
the student will not move beyond interpreting the ethics code at a conventional level. 
Therefore, such an environment does not foster consolidation of ethical beliefs into one's 
identity, as one does not become confident and comfortable in adequately addressing or 
resolving ethical and moral dilemmas and the associated emotions. Without 
encouragement to seek supervision when feeling negative emotions or anxiety, the risk of 
unethical behavior is increased and internalization of an effective moral schema is 
hampered. With the elimination of the oral examination for licensure in the state of 
California, the role of supervision in adequately and openly addressing values and beliefs 
cannot be over-emphasized. Lambert and Ogles (1997) suggest that, in addition to 
development of therapeutic techniques, effective supervision includes assisting trainee's 
to become aware of their values and morals while fostering personal growth, to develop 
moral schemas, emotional self-regulation and abstract reasoning skills. Additionally, 
clinical supervision includes assisting students to increase their moral sensitivity to 
potential ethical and moral dilemmas. Supervision may assist students in learning about 
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and effectively coping with their own emotional reactions to the distress a client may be 
experiencing. Specifically, students need to become aware of both affective empathic 
and cognitive empathic responses and how these may each cue the moral reasoning 
process. 
Present Study 
Professionally and in student training, moral behavior appears to consist of an 
interaction of professional education experiences and perceptions of the moral climate, 
and moral sensitivity to potential moral dilemmas including empathy, perspective taking 
and the ability emotionally self-regulate (Blasi, 1980; 1994; Brockett, et al., 1997; 
Holmes, 1996; Koocher, 1998; Leonard, 1997; Rest & Narvaez, 1994, Ruiz & Vallejos, 
1999; Zilger, 1999). Through ethical identity development, emotional self-regulation, 
clinical supervision, mentoring, and experiential role-taking, the likelihood of effective 
moral reasoning and moral behavior improve the consolidation of moral values into one's 
identity. Without moral sensitivity, moral schemas fail to be activated and the moral 
reasoning process is not initiated. Moral sensitivity is not guaranteed by classroom ethics 
training alone. In fact, moral sensitivity may be enhanced or diminished as a result of the 
training environment (Bebeau, 2002; Jaeger, 2001 ). Development of moral sensitivity 
requires experiential learning in real day-to-day situations in an environment that is 
supportive and open to promote consolidation of moral values. Additionally, 
interpretation and understanding of an ethics code at a conventional level (maintaining 
norms, rule-based) will not adequately prepare psychology students for the implicit 
decision-making they will experience in a therapeutic setting. Consistent moral action is 
likely to result when an ethics code is interpreted and understood at a postconventional 
level (creating norms with the goal of societal cooperation) and when such ideals have 
been consolidated, through the development of moral schemas. Research into how the 
students' perceptions of their academic and supervision experiences impact moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning skills will provide information to tailor educational and 
professional development experiences to foster moral schema development. 
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The public and professional associations expect psychology students and 
psychologists to act in an ethical and moral manner. The levels of trust and intimacy 
achieved in a therapeutic environment place a client at potential risk if the therapist acts 
in an unethical or immoral manner. Historically, moral development and ethics training 
have employed discussion of ethical dilemmas as a method to foster moral growth (Rest 
& Narvaez, 1994). Although Kohlberg was influential in getting people to look 
internally for moral development, recent research indicates that moral development is 
based on a combination of age (specifically for stages one through four) and experience 
(specifically for advancement to stages five and six) (Rest, Thoma & Edwards, 1997). 
However, for Koocher (1998) an underlying assumption of the ethics code is that 
psychology students and psychologists have already incorporated the ethical principles 
espoused by the code into their personalities. 
The majority of research in moral development has focused on the moral 
reasoning component of Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior (Rest, 1994; 
Rest & Narvaez, 1994; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). These authors advocate 
that moral development improves with an increase in thinking skills. Typically, 
behaviors, cognitions and affect have been studied in isolation. Assessing only one 
component of morality does not provide a complete reflection of the skills an individual 
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incorporates when encountering a moral dilemma. Additionally, assessment of only one 
component may underestimate the intent of moral behavior if an individual is in the 
process of transition; whereas if the individual is in a process of consolidation the 
association with intent of moral behavior may be strengthened (Thoma et al, 1991; 
Thoma & Rest, 1999; Walker & Taylor, 1991). At an educational level, ethics training 
initially targets the components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Yet, moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning are each necessary but not sufficient for moral behavior 
to occur. However, the adequate development of the component of moral sensitivity and 
activation of one's moral schema is necessary to start the moral reasoning process. Moral 
development research has examined moral reasoning in physicians, dentists, nurses, and 
veterinarians (Rest & Narvaez, 1994); however, there is little research on moral reasoning 
in providers of psychological services. Bebeau (2002) found that research has not 
adequately examined the influence of the moral climate provided in professional 
development experiences on moral reasoning. 
Development of moral sensitivity, and thus moral reasoning, may be either 
fostered or hindered by the moral climate the student is exposed to during their 
professional training and development. There are no known empirical studies 
investigating graduate psychology students' perceptions of their moral climate, and how 
their moral climate influences the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning. The present study will examine these relationships (see Figure 2a and Figure 
2b ). The present study posits that the constructs of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning 
are positively related and that moral sensitivity initiates the moral reasoning process. 
Although these constructs are positively correlated, these correlations are typically small 
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indicating that there are potentially other variables that either mediate or moderate this 
relationship. Rest and others have stated that to adequately define and measure all four 
components is a formidable task, and recommend isolating facets of the components, and 
that over time a body of empirical research will reveal insights into the patterns of 
relationships of the four components with each other and with other variables. A 
criticism of the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior has been that despite 
asserting that each component is made up of both cognitive and affective factors, research 
has focused on the cognitive aspects (Walker, 2002). This deficit will be addressed in the 
present study, in that affective and cognitive processes are included in the component of 
moral sensitivity, which Walker (2002) states is essential in the assessment of this 
component. Moral sensitivity, including an empathic response to a moral dilemma, may 
activate a moral schema to cue the moral reasoning process. Specifically, the present 
study will look at both affective (awareness of emotional arousal) and cognitive 
(perspective-taking, that another person is experiencing distress) facets of empathy and 
their relationship to moral reasoning. Additionally, how one learns to become aware of 
and regulate their empathic responses and their ability to perspective take in moral 
dilemmas encountered in therapeutic settings is influenced by the quality and perception 
of their academic and clinical supervision experience. In supervision environments that 
students' perceive as open and supportive, the student will feel secure in opening 
discussion on any potential dilemmas they may encounter as well as is discussing their 
personal emotional reactions to such dilemmas. Such open environments, in which the 
student has clear expectations regarding their role, the role of the supervisor and the goals 
of supervision, moral sensitivity and moral reasoning will be enhanced as the learning of 
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and use of the ethics code in daily practice is personalized for the student. In supervision 
environments that are perceived as closed or hostile (i.e.; the 'hidden curriculum'), in 
which the student feels vulnerable or at risk for admitting or disclosing any perceived 
weaknesses or the student is unclear of the goals of supervision, development of moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning may be hampered in that any issues or concerns the 
student may be experiencing will not be brought into an open discussion in an effort for 
resolution or advancement of reasoning skills. In such closed situations, moral dilemmas 
will not be discussed and the student will not benefit from the opportunity or experience 
of learning to interpret the ethics code within their personal moral schema framework. 
The findings of this study add to an under-investigated area and may greatly aid in 
tailoring a moral climate that promotes the student-mentor relationship to adequately 
foster moral schema development, especially in morally ambiguous or negative affect 
situations. 
··································································~ 
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Figure 2a. Mediator relationship to be examined. 
Moral Climate 
Figure 2b. Moderator relationship to be examined. 
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Hypotheses 
To test the conceptual model the following specific hypotheses will be examined. 
1. Moral sensitivity will correlate with moral climate. 
a. Moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy will positively 
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the nurturance subscale 
of the Leaming Environment Survey (LES). 
b. Moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy, will negatively 
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and 
ambiguities scale from the Supervisees' Perception of Supervision 
Experience (SPSE) survey. 
c. Moral sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, will positively 
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the nurturance subscale 
from the LES. 
d. Moral sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, will negatively 
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and 
ambiguities scale from the SPSE. 
e. Moral sensitivity, as measured by total empathy, will positively 
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the nurturance subscale 
from the LES. 
f Moral sensitivity, as measured by total empathy, will negatively 
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and 
ambiguities scale from the SPSE. 
2. Moral climate will correlate with moral reasoning. 
a. Moral climate, as measured by nurturance from the LES, will positively 
correlate with moral reasoning, as measured by the N2 score and the U 
score from the DIT-2. 
b. Moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and ambiguities scale 
from the SPSE, will negatively correlate with moral reasoning, as 
measured by the N2 score and the U score from the DIT-2. 
3. Moral sensitivity will correlate with moral reasoning. 
a. Moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy, will positively 
correlate with moral reasoning, as measured by the N2 score and the U 
score from the DIT-2. 
b. Moral sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, will positively 
correlate with moral reasoning, as measured by the N2 score and the U 
score from the DIT-2 
c. Affective empathy will have a stronger positive correlation with moral 
reasoning than cognitive empathy. 
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4. It will be determined whether moral climate mediates or moderates the 
relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Structural equation 
modeling was used to test for mediator relationships. To investigate moral climate for a 
mediator effect, first a significant relationship must exist between moral sensitivity and 
moral reasoning. If a significant relationship is found, then the construct of moral climate 
will be added to the model. If with the addition of moral climate, the relationship 
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning is no longer statistically significant or 
remains significant due to sample size yet substantially diminishes in magnitude, then 
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moral climate is mediating this relationship. If no mediator effects are found, moral 
climate will then be tested to determine if it moderates the relationship between moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning. A moderator term was created from the standardized 
product of the main effects. Hierarchical regression was used to test for moderator 
effects, entering each main effect in sequence and the moderator term on the final block. 
If the addition of the moderator term is statistically significant, explaining variance above 
and beyond the main effects, then moral climate moderates the relationship between 
moral sensitivity and moral climate. 
a. Moral climate will mediate the relationship between moral sensitivity, 
as measured by cognitive empathy, and moral reasoning. 
b. It will be determined whether moral climate mediates or moderates the 
relationship between moral sensitivity, as measured by affective 
empathy, and moral reasoning. 
c. It will be determined whether moral climate mediates or moderates the 
relationship between moral sensitivity, as measured by total empathy, 
and moral reasoning. 
Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited through a recruitment flyer (see Appendix A) requesting 
participation in the research project from graduate-level clinical psychology students 
currently enrolled in an academic program. Four-hundred-and twenty recruitment flyers 
were distributed to student mailboxes at various southern California universities. 
Additionally, an electronic copy of the recruitment flyer was posted on the APAGS 
listservs; however, it is unknown how many potential subjects accessed the electronic 
copy of the recruitment flyer. A total of 84 surveys were requested and 55 completed 
surveys were returned, for a response rate of 65%. Subjects comprised all years of 
graduate training in clinical psychology. Only graduate-level psychology students who 
had completed supervised clinical work or who were currently being supervised in 
clinical work were eligible to participate. 
Of the 55 completed surveys returned, 52 subjects had usable data for analyses. 
The final 52 participants consisted of 45 females and 7 males, with an average age of 
30.9 years (sd = 6.8 years). Twenty-three subjects (44%) were enrolled in a Psy.D. 
program, twenty-seven (52%) were enrolled in a Ph.D. program, one was enrolled in 
Master's level program and one had completed her Ph.D. the month prior to completing 
the survey and was now in a Post Doctoral position. Forty-eight participants were in a 
clinical program (92%) and two indicated they were now in an experimental program 
(4%). Program year ranged from first to greater than seven years, with 30 subjects (58%) 
indicating that they were in their third, fourth, or fifth year. Thirty subjects (65%) 
indicated membership in a national psychological association, and twelve (23%) 
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indicated membership in a state psychological association. There were an average of 4.9 
( sd = 3 .4) clinical supervisors, and a total of 28.4 months ( sd = 19 .4) of supervised 
clinical experience across all supervision experiences, revealing a range of supervision 
and professional development exposure. 
Measures 
All participants who requested a survey were provided with an Informed consent 
(Appendix B). Demographic information, including age, gender, year in program, prior 
degrees, professional licenses, professional or student affiliations, number of professional 
presentations, number of publications, supervision experience valance rating (positive or 
negative), length of time of rated supervision experience, total amount of supervision 
experience, and total number of clinical supervisors were collected (see Appendix C). 
Moral Sensitivity. Moral sensitivity, or the activation of a moral schema 
including perspective taking ability, was operationalized by a multidimensional 
assessment of empathy with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983). This 
measure (see Appendix C, items 7 - 34) has 28-items and asks subjects to indicate how 
well each item describes them on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Does not describe 
me well to Does describe me well. The scale assesses affective and cognitive aspects of 
empathy with the four subscales: perspective taking, personal distress, fantasy, and 
empathic concern. The perspective taking subscale measures the individual's tendency to 
understand the viewpoints of others, and sample items include, "When I am upset at 
someone, I usually try to put myself in their shoes for a while," and "Before criticizing 
somebody, I try to image how I would feel ifl were in their place." The personal distress 
subscale measures the individual's feelings of anxiety in interpersonal situations, and 
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sample items include, ''I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very 
emotional situation," and "When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm (reversed 
scored)." The fantasy subscale measures the individual's tendency to see things from the 
viewpoint of characters in movies, novels or theatre, and sample items include, ''After 
seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters," and "When I 
am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the 
story were happening to me." The empathic concern subscale measures the individual's 
tendency to sympathize with the feelings of others, and sample items include, "I often 
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me," and "Sometimes I do 
not feel sorry for people when they are having problems (reversed scored)." (Brems, 
1988; Evans, Stanley, & Burrows, 1993; Morton, Worthley, Riggs, & Testerman, 2002). 
In factor analysis, Brems (1988) found that the perspective taking and personal distress 
subscales could be combined to create a cognitive empathy factor while the empathic 
concern and fantasy subscales could be combined to create an affective empathy factor. 
In the present study, perspective taking and personal distress were summed to create a 
cognitive empathy score (14 items). Fantasy and empathic concern were summed to 
create an affective empathy score ( 14 items). The cognitive and affective empathy scores 
were summed to create a total empathy score (28 items). It appears that the affective 
empathy component is tapping into awareness of affective and emotional arousal in 
response to external triggers or the emotions others are experiencing, while the cognitive 
empathy factor is tapping not into awareness of one's own affective and emotional 
arousal but into awareness of the distress that another may be experiencing and how 
perceives issues of personal control when they perceive that another person is 
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experiencing emotional distress. Both the cognitive and affective factors were analyzed, 
in addition to the total empathy score, in order to investigate if there were differences 
related to the recognition, awareness and acceptance of one's emotional arousal (affective 
empathy) and the awareness that another is experiencing distress and feeling of being 
able to control oneself when others are experiencing distress (cognitive empathy). The 
IR.I has demonstrated good test-retest reliability (. 62-. 81) and internal consistency (. 71-
. 78) (Brems, 1988; Evans, Stanley, & Burrows, 1993; Coman, Evans, & Stanley, 1988; 
Davis, 1983; Davis & Oathout, 1987; and Morton, Worthley, Riggs, & Testerman, 2001). 
Davis and Oathout (1987) summarize validity studies of the IR.I, concluding that the scale 
is measuring empathy. In the present study, each scale demonstrated good to adequate 
reliability; affective empathy Cronbach' s a = . 78, cognitive empathy Cronbach' s a = . 59, 
and the total empathy Cronbach's a= .80. Scores on affective empathy ranged from 34 
to 69 (possible range: 14- 70), cognitive empathy scores ranged from 28 to 52 (possible 
range: 14- 70), and total empathy scores ranged from 67 to 120 (possible range: 28 to 
140 ), with higher scores indicating more empathy. 
Moral Climate. Moral climate was assessed using an adaptation of the Medical 
School Learning Environment Survey (LES) (Feletti & Clarke, 1981; Marshall, 1978; 
Moore-West, Harrington, Mennin, Kaufman, & Skipper, 1989). The original scale 
consisted of 50 items and was intended for students at a medical school, and was 
demonstrated to generalize to other educational curricula (Feletti & Clarke, 1981). This 
self-report subscale asked subjects to indicate how well each item reflects their 
perceptions of the support of their learning environment on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from This happens rarely, if at all to This happens very frequently. In the present study, 
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only the Nurturance subscale ( 4 items) (see Appendix C, items 35 - 38) to assess 
students' perception of the support they are receiving from their academic institution was 
used (Marshall, 1978). Sample items on the nurturance scale include, "The department 
takes an interest in my personal welfare," and "When giving criticism or answering a 
question, faculty appear to be genuinely interested in helping me." The reliability for 
each of the subscales of the original 50 item version, ranges from .56- .82, while the 
reliability for the total scale ranges from .85 - .94 (Feletti & Clarke, 1981, Marshall, 
1978). Moore-West et al., (1989) examined a shortened 30-item version, in which five 
subscales, Student-student Interaction, Emotional Climate, Nurturance, Meaningful 
Learning Experience and Organizational Breadth of Interest, revealed internal 
coefficients of reliability that ranged from . 70 - . 86, indicating moderate to high 
reliability. In the present study, this scale demonstrated adequate reliability (Cronbach's 
a= .81). Scores on this scale ranged from 7 to 20 (possible range: 4-20), with higher 
scores indicating more of the construct being measured. 
Moral climate was also assessed with the 29-item Supervisees' Perception of 
Supervision Experience Scale (Olk & Friedlander, 1992). This self-report scale (see 
Appendix C, items 40 - 68) asked subjects to describe their clinical supervision 
experience and rate the impact of this supervision with the supervisor whom they believe 
has made the greatest impact, positive or negative, on their professional and ethical 
development. Participants were asked how well each item reflects their perception of 
their supervision experience on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from This happens rarely, 
if at all to This happens very frequently. This measure consists of two subscales, Role 
Ambiguity (16 items) and Role Conflict (13 items), which were summed for a Role 
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Conflicts and Ambiguities score. The role ambiguity subscale measures uncertainty 
about supervisory expectations, uncertainty in how to meet these expectations, and 
uncertainty on how one will be evaluated in supervision. Sample items from the role 
ambiguity scale include, "I was uncertain about what material to present to my 
supervisor," "My supervisor's criteria for evaluating my work were not specific," and 
"The feedback I got from my supervisor did not help me to know what was expected of 
me in my day-to-day work with clients." The role conflict subscale measures experiences 
associated with being in the role of a student-trainee in opposition to a professional 
colleague who is expected to demonstrate autonomy in decision making. Sample items 
from the role conflict scale include, "I believe that my supervisor's behavior in one or 
more situations was unethical or illegal and I was undecided about whether to confront 
him/her," "I felt that my supervisor was incompetent or less competent than I. I often felt 
as if I was supervising him/her," and "I disagreed with my supervisor about 
implementing a specific technique, but I also wanted to do what the supervisor thought 
best." Olk and Friedlander report that the role ambiguity scale demonstrated Cronbach's 
a= .91, and the role conflict scale a Cronbach's a= .89, and that the two scales were 
significantly correlated (r = .59,p:::; .01). In the present study, each scale demonstrated 
adequate reliability; role ambiguity Cronbach's a= .94, role conflict Cronbach's a= .92, 
and total role conflicts and ambiguities Cronbach's a= .96. Role ambiguity scores 
ranged from 16 to 68 (total possible range: 16- 80), role conflict scores ranged from 13 
to 52 (possible range: 13 - 65), and total role conflicts and ambiguities ranged from 29 to 
116 (possible range: 29- 145), with higher scores indicating more conflict or ambiguity. 
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Moral Reasoning. The Defining Issues Test- 2 (DIT-2) (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, 
& Bebeau, 1999) was used to operationalize moral reasoning. The DIT-2 is an updated 
and improved version of the DIT. Bebeau's (2002) review of the DIT and professional 
education supports use of the DIT as an outcome measure of the influence of the moral 
climate in academic settings. The DIT-2 updates the wording of the dilemmas, has fewer 
items (five dilemmas instead of six), and gives more precise instructions. It continues to 
measure personal interest, maintaining norms, and creating norms moral schemas. 
Dilemmas include scenarios of free speech, euthanasia, providing for one's family, right 
to know, and public access. The DIT and DIT-2 focus on tacit moral reasoning rather 
than on the actual reasoning used by the subject (Walker, 2002). Subjects are asked to 
read a dilemma and to rate on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Great Importance to 
No Importance 12 issues to be considered in the process of decision-making to resolve 
the dilemma and then they are to rank the four most important of the 12 issues to be 
considered in decision-making for each of five dilemmas. Additionally, on a 3-point 
Likert scale, subjects were asked to indicate their favored action choice. Subjects must 
pass each of five reliability checks to determine that reliable responses were provided. 
The five reliability checks are: 1) rate-and-rank consistency - reliable subjects 
demonstrate consistency in rating (the first task) and ranking (the second task) the same 
item, if there is too much inconsistency (scores greater than 200) the assumption is that 
the subject randomly responded or gave bogus data and is purged (one subject in the 
preset study was purged for failing this reliability check); 2) meaningless items - these 
are items that sound plausible but are deliberately designed to be meaningless, if too 
many are endorsed (greater than 10) the assumption is that the subject is responding to 
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the wording style rather than to the item meaning and is purged; 3) missing rates - an 
occasional missed rating is tolerated; however, too many missed ratings (missing greater 
than three of the 12 ratings invalidates a dilemma, one invalidated dilemma is tolerated-
that is, at minimum, the subject must give at least nine ratings on each of four dilemmas 
in order to pass this validity check) questions the subject's motivation to provide reliable 
data and the subject is purged; 4) missing ranks - if a subject misses more than six ranks 
they are purged; and 5) non-differentiation of rates or ranks - this occurs when a subject 
rates all 12 issues the same or ranks the same item as 18\ 2°d, 3rd and 4th most important, 
one invalidated dilemma is tolerated; that is, at minimum a subject must give at least two 
different ratings to the 12 items on at least four dilemmas and they must select different 
items in the rankings. 
The present study used the N2 and the U scores. The N2 is an index of moral 
reasoning development, and is a combination of the subjects' rankings of 
postconventional items and differences between postconventional and personal interest 
items (Walker, 2002). The authors report that the N2 index of the DIT-2 is 
psychometrically superior to the P% index of the DIT. The U score is a utilizer score 
and acts as a moderator variable between level of moral reasoning and action choice. 
That is, the U score is an indicator of the fit between the items ranked as most important 
and action choice, with the higher U scores indicating a good fit between the subjects' 
ratings of important issues and rankings of the four most important issues (Rest, Narvaez, 
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). Nucci (2002) reports that the U score improves the DIT's 
ability to predict behavior. The usefulness of the N2 *U moderator term, as a measure of 
the fit between level of reasoning skill and the action choice made, was also investigated. 
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The DIT has been extensively studied and has demonstrated content validity, 
predictive validity, convergent validity and internal consistency (Rest & Narvaez, 1998; 
Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). The DIT and DIT-2 are well correlated = . 79. 
Correction for attenuation reveals that the correlation between the DIT and DIT-2 is 
between .95 - .99. Cronbach's alpha is in the upper .70's to lower .80's, which indicates 
adequate internal reliability. A review of the items indicates that the DIT-2 has face 
validity, and although prior research indicates that one can not 'fake good' on this 
measure (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999), there may be some concern that it may 
sensitize subjects to look for moral dilemmas in the other measures. Educational level is 
positively correlated with DIT-2 scores, although in the present study education level was 
controlled for by only including graduate-level psychology students. DIT-2 scores are 
moderately to strongly positively related to intelligence and GP A (r = .20 to .50), and 
positively correlated to pro-social behaviors and professional decision making. 
The DIT-2 was returned to the Center for the Study of Ethical Development for 
scoring. One subject was purged due to failing one of the five reliability checks (scoring 
greater than 200 on the rating-and-ranking consistency check), and one subject, although 
passing all five reliability checks, did not provide enough data for a U score to be 
computed. In many studies upwards of 15% of the sample are purged due to failing at 
least one of the five reliability checks; however, in the present study only one subject 
(2%) was purged for failing a reliability check, indicating that overall the subjects 
provided reliable data. Due to the nature of this measure and the algorithms used in score 
calculation, it is not possible to replace missing values, nor is it possible to calculate a 
Cronbach's a from the data returned by the Center for the Study of Ethical Development. 
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The returned N2 scores ranged from 12.55 to 70.20, and the U scores ranged from -.10 to 
.46. These ranges are consistent with findings of graduate students in other academic 
programs. 
Procedures 
As instructed in the recruitment flyer, interested subjects contacted the researcher 
to have a survey packet mailed to them at an address of their choice. The survey packet 
contained information on the study, the Informed Consent, survey completion 
instructions, survey measures, an addressed and stamped raffle entry postcard (see 
Appendix D) and a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Anonymity was assured by 
use of a subject number. The opportunity to enter a raffle for a chance to win one of two 
$50.00 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com was provided with a separate raffle entry 
postcard, indicating a telephone number or email address to contact the two winners. 
Approximately two weeks following the mailing of the survey materials, a follow-up 
thank you/reminder postcard (see Appendix E) was sent to all the participants who 
received surveys. At that time, the addresses to which the surveys and follow-up thank 
you/reminder postcard were sent to were destroyed. 
Results 
Prior to analysis the data were reviewed to assure that parametric assumptions 
were met. Data were then analyzed at the univariate level followed by the multivariate 
level, to explore the relationships among the measured variables and then among the 
constructs of moral sensitivity, moral climate, and moral reasoning. Analyses then tested 
moral climate for mediator and moderator effects on the relationship between moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning. 
Data Screening 
The histograms for the U score from the DIT-2 and the role conflicts and 
ambiguities scale were slightly positively skewed; however, non-linear transformations 
were not perfonned as regression and structural equation modeling are robust to 
violations of normality. All other variables of interest were normally distributed. Outlier 
criteria were set at greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean. No outliers 
greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean were identified on any of the 
measured variables of interest. One outlier was identified on time since rated 
supervision, the supervision had occurred 10 years ago; however, as this is not a 
measured variable of interest an examination of the correlations between the measured 
variables of interest with this subject retained and removed were compared. The 
comparison of the two correlation matrices indicated changes in correlation strength 
occurred only at the 1 ooth and 1 oooth decimal place; thus, given the minimal change on 
the relationships of the measured variables of interest this subject was retained. Scatter 
plots of the measured variables of interest revealed linear relationships. 
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Characteristics of Subjects 
Three subjects had missing data; one subject was missing the U score from the 
DIT-2 as they did not provide enough responses for calculati.on, one subject was missing 
the N2 score from the DIT-2 due to being purged for failing the rating-and-ranking 
reliability check, and one subject did not have cognitive empathy or total empathy scores 
due to missing items nor did this subject have a nurturance scale total score as they did 
not complete any items on this scale. These three subjects were removed from all further 
analyses. Table 3 presents the demographic information of the initial sample (N = 55) 
and the final sample (N = 52), and Table 4 presents data of the initial sample and the final 
sample on supervision and professional involvement. In comparing the subjects with 
missing data to the final sample, the missing data group was significantly older (M missing 
= 41.33; M final= 30.90), t = 2.60,p = .01 and rated a more recent supervision experience 
(months since supervision experience) (M missing= 14.00; M final= 16.35), t = 3.08,p = 
.003. No other significant differences were found on the demographic, supervision or 
professional involvement variables. Table 5 presents the measured variables of interest 
for the initial sample and the final sample. The group with missing data scored 
significantly lower on the U score than the completion group (M missing= 0.02; M final= 
0 .10 ), t = 3. 87, p = . 01. No other significant differences between the missing data group 
and the completion group were noted on any of the measured variables. 
In the final sample, year in program significantly correlated with total amount of 
time in clinical supervision (r = . 62, p = . 01 ), time since rated supervision significantly 
correlated with age (r = .30,p = .03), and length of rated supervision significantly 
correlated with total amount of time in clinical supervision (r = .30,p = .04). As 
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expected, as year in program increased, total amount of time in clinical supervision and 
the number of clinical supervisors also increased. 
Table 3 
Demographics of Initial Sample versus Final Sample 
Initial Sample Final Sample 
(N = 55) (N = 52) 
M SD M SD 
Age 
31.5 7.1 30.9 6.8 
Male 8 7 
Gender 
Female 47 45 
MAIMS 2 1 
Program PsyD 24 23 
Currently 
PhD 28 27 Emolledln 
Post Doc 1 1 
Clinical 50 48 
Program Type 
Experimental Currently 2 2 
Enrolled In 
Missing 3 2 
First 6 5 
Second 7 6 
Third 10 9 
Fourth 12 12 
Program Year 
Fifth 9 9 
Sixth 6 6 
Seventh 4 4 
Other 1 1 
BA/BS 15 15 
Previously MAIMS 38 35 
Completed 
Doctorate 1 1 Degree 
MFT 1 1 
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Table 4 
Professional and Sul!_ervision ExP._erience of Initial Saml!_le versus Final Saml!_le 
Initial Sample (N = 55) 
Final Sample (N = 
52) 
APA 25 45.45% 24 46.15% 
APA/APAGS 7 12.73% 6 11.54% 
National APAJAPS 1 1.82% 1 1.92% 
Professional 
APA/APIC 1 1.82% 1 1.92% Memberships 
APA/APAGS/APIC 2 3.64% 2 3.85% 
None 19 34.55% 18 34.62% 
California 3 5.45% 2 9.62% 
Maryland 5 9.09% 5 9.62% 
Georgia 1 1.82% 0 0.00% 
State 
Professional WPA 3 5.45% 3 5.77% 
Memberships California & WP A 1 1.82% 1 1.92% 
Oregon 1 1.82% 1 1.92% 
None 41 74.55% 40 76.92% 
M SD M SD 
Number of Poster Presentations 2.5 4.4 2.6 4.6 
Number of Publications .8 1.1 .7 1.1 
Number of Supervision Months of 8.9 5.6 9.0 5.7 
Rated Supervision 
Time Since Rated Supervision 20.0 39.0 16.35 34.6 
Total Number of Supervision 27.5 19.3 28.4 19.4 
Months 
Number of Clinical Supervisors 4.8 3.3 4.9 3.4 
Note. AP A - American Psychological Association; AP AGS - American Psychological 
Association Graduate Students; APS - American Psychological Society; APIC - ; WP A 
- Western Psychological Association 
Correlations between professional activities and supervision experience variables 
were examined. In examining potential differences by National Professional 
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Membership, differences were found in number of poster presentations (p = . 01) and 
number of publications (p = .01). Specifically, these differences by National Professional 
Membership were due to one participant, a member of both APA and APAGS having 
been involved in significantly more poster presentations (25) than all other subjects (M = 
2.6), while another two subjects, both members of APA, APAGS and APS had 
significantly more publications (3) than the other subjects (M = .63). At the State 
Professional Membership level, members of the Maryland State Psychological 
Association had significantly (p = .01) more publications (2.40) thanthe other subjects 
(M = . 60). The correlations between the professional activities and the measured 
constructs were also examined; however, no meaningful or significant correlations were 




Means and Standard Deviations of Measured Variables of Interest 
Initial Sample (N = Final Sample (N = 
55) 52) 
M SD M SD 
Moral N2 Score 47.1 13.8 47.4 13.3 
Reasoning U Score 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Nurturance 14.8 3.7 14.8 3.7 
Moral 
Role Conflicts and 
Climate 59.6 25.5 58.3 25.0 
Ambiguities 
Affective 52.4 7.0 52.3 7.2 
Moral 
Cognitive 41.0 5.4 41.1 5.2 
Sensitivity 
Total Empathy 93.4 10.9 93.4 10.8 
Potential Covariates 
In the final sample some group differences were noted on the measured variables 
of interest. Females scored significantly higher on cognitive empathy (M females= 41.9; M 
males= 35.6), t = 3.3,p = .002, and total empathy (M females= 94.6; M males= 85.7), t = 2.1, 
p = .04 than males. Differences were also noted between subjects who chose to rate a 
positive supervision experience (N = 38) instead of a negative supervision experience (N 
= 14 ). Those who rated a positive supervision experience were significantly older than 
those who rated a negative supervision experience (M positive= 32.5; M negative= 26.5), t = 
4.7,p = .001, and scored significantly higher on the N2 score (M positive= 49.6; M negative= 
41.3), t = 2.0,p = .05. Additionally, persons who rated a negative supervision experience 
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scored significantly higher on role conflicts and ambiguities (M negative= 86.6; M positive= 
47.9), t = 6.8,p = .001 than those who rated a positive supervision experience. As age is 
correlated with moral development, the differences found in the N2 scores and the role 
conflicts and ambiguities scores were investigated to determine if they could be attributed 
to age. Age was partialled out and investigated whether or not these positive versus 
negative supervision experience differences were maintained by examining the 
standardize residuals. The two rating groups were no longer significantly different on N2 
scores; however, persons who rated a negative supervision experience still scored 
significantly higher on role conflict and ambiguities (M negative= 1.00; M positive= -.37), t = 
5.55,p = .001. This difference in the role conflict and ambiguities score is of interest; 
however, due to the overall small sample size and having so few persons who rated a 
negative supervision experience, these groups were collapsed as there was not enough 
power to run separate analyses. Due to these differences, age and supervision valence 
rating (positive or negative) were used as covariates in all multivariate analyses. No 
significant group differences were found by program currently enrolled in, program type 
(clinical versus experimental), program year, or previously completed degree on the 
measured variables of moral sensitivity, moral climate or moral reasoning. 
Results 
The correlations among the measured variables of interest are presented in Table 
6. None of the correlations are strong enough to risk multicollinearity. Although both 
affective empathy and cognitive empathy are strongly and significantly correlated with 
total empathy, multicollinearity is not a problem as the analyses do not examine the 
subscales and total empathy within the same analyses. As shown in Table 6, the 
59 
nurturance subscale is weakly correlated with the U score; however it does not positively 
correlate with N2, affective empathy, cognitive empathy nor total empathy. Due to weak 
correlations within the construct of moral climate, nurturance was removed from further 
analyses. Also shown in Table 6, the N2*U variable is weakly correlated with affective 
empathy, cognitive empathy, total empathy, and due to the weak correlations within the 
construct of moral reasoning, N2*U was removed from further analyses. 
All measured variables were standardized prior to further analyses to account for 
differences in scale metrics. As noted previously, education was controlled for by only 
including graduate-level psychology students. Age and supervision valence rating 
(positive versus negative) were used as covariates in all subsequent analyses to account 
for maturation and the group difference between those who rated a positive versus 
negative supervision experience. All mediator and moderator relationships were tested 
for according to the procedure indicated by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Table 6 
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Moral climate's associations with moral sensitivity and moral reasoning were 
examined first. The hypotheses regarding the positive correlation of a nurturing 
academic environment and moral sensitivity and moral reasoning was not supported as 
moral climate, as measured by nurturance, did not correlate with moral sensitivity, as 
measured by affective, cognitive or total empathy, or moral reasoning, as measured by 
the N2, U score or N2*U score (see Table 6). The hypothesis that moral climate, as 
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measured by role ambiguity, role conflict and role conflicts and ambiguities, would 
negatively correlate with moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy, cognitive 
empathy and total empathy, was not supported (see Tables 6 and 7). However, the 
hypothesis that moral climate, as measured by role conflict, role ambiguity, and role 
conflicts and ambiguities, would negatively correlate with moral reasoning was partially 
supported (see Tables 6 and 7). Role conflict, role ambiguity, and role conflicts and 
ambiguities negatively correlate with the N2 score as a measure of moral reasoning. 
Table 7 
Correlations between Moral Climate, Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning 
Moral Climate 
Role Conflicts 
Role Ambiguity Role Conflict 
and Ambiguities 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
U Score -.10 -.04 -.14 .06 .10 .06 -.03 .03 -.06 
Moral 
Reasoning N2 ... Jl* -.27 -.17 -.28* -.25 -.16 -.31* -.27 -.18 
Affective .07 .06 -.10 -.002 -.01 -.15 .04 .03 -.13 
Moral Cognitive .04 .05 -.02 .05 .05 -.001 .05 .05 -.01 
Sensitivity 
Total .07 .06 -.07 .02 .02 -.10 .05 .05 -.09 
Em2athy 
Note. * p :S .05. 1 =zero-order correlations. 2 =partial correlation after age removed. 3 = 
partial correlation after age and supervision valence rating (positive versus negative) 
removed. 
The relationships of the measured variables of moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning were examined next (see Table 8). Prior to any covariates, affective empathy 
is positively correlated with the N2 score (r = .30). No other empathy and moral 
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reasoning correlations were significant. Partialling out age had minimal impact on the 
relationships (see Table 8); however, upon partialling out age and supervision valence 
rating (positive or negative), total empathy became positively correlated with N2. Thus, 
at the measured variable level, only affective empathy positively correlates with moral 
reasoning (N2). These findings partially support hypothesis three, that moral sensitivity 
will positively correlate with moral reasoning and that affective empathy will 
demonstrate the strongest correlation with moral reasoning. Additionally, these findings, 
demonstrating a significant correlation between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning 
provide the basis for testing the mediator relationships described in hypothesis four. 
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Table 8 
Correlations between Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning with Age and Supervision 
Valence as Covariates 
Moral Reasoning 
U Score N2 Score 
Moral 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Sensitivity 
Affective -.05 -.04 -.06 .30* .31* .37** 
Empathy 
Cognitive -.05 -.05 -.06 .06 .06 .08 
Empathy 
Total Empathy -.06 -.05 -.07 .22 .24 .28* 
Note. * p :S .05, ** p :S .01. 1 =zero order correlations, 2 =partial correlation after age 
removed, 3 = partial correlation after age and supervision valence removed. 
As stated previously, moral sensitivity initiates the moral reasoning process, thus 
implying a positive correlation between these two constructs. However, there may be 
other variables that either mediate or moderate this relationship. Rest and others 
recommend isolating facets of the individual components to reveal insights into the 
patterns of relationships of the four components with each other and with other variables 
over time. For the present study, empathy, measured both cognitively and affectively, 
was isolated as one facet of moral sensitivity. The construct of moral reasoning was 
assessed using the N2 and U scores. The results reveal how these measures are related at 
the univariate and bivariate levels; however, as more than one measure was used to 
define each component, structural equation modeling and regression analyses were used 
to investigate the relationships among the components at the multivariate level. All 
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multivariate analyses were done on the residuals after covarying out age and supervision 
valence (positive or negative). 
Baron and Kenny (1986) emphasize the importance of not using the terms 
mediator and moderator interchangeably. They discuss the difficulty in distinguishing if 
a variable is a potential mediator or moderator, and suggest that the suspected variable be 
tested for both mediator and moderator effects. The present study followed the steps 
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Ironson, Solomon, Balbin, O'Cleirigh, 
George, Kumar, Larson, and Woods (2002) to test for mediator and moderator effects. 
To test for a mediated effect, initially a significant relationship must be established 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. A mediated effect occurs 
when a third variable accounts for the relationship between an independent variable and 
the dependent variable. That is, the independent variable is meaningfully correlated with 
the mediating variable and the mediating variable is meaningfully correlated with the 
dependent variable, and with the addition of the mediating variable the independent 
variable is no longer meaningfully related to the dependent variable. According to Baron 
and Kenny a mediated effect occurs if the once significant relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable is no longer significant with the addition 
of the mediating variable; however, in larger samples this relationship may remain 
significant due to sample size while the magnitude of the relationship substantially 
diminishes to indicate a mediated effect. If the independent-dependent correlation 
becomes zero with the addition of the mediating variable, then the mediating variable 
fully mediates this relationship. If the independent-dependent correlation is no longer 
significant (or remains significant due to a larger sample size but the magnitude 
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substantially decreases) but the absolute value is greater than zero then the mediating 
variable is partially mediating this relationship and there are other mediating variables. 
In the situation where multiple measures are used to measure a construct, Baron and 
Kenny recommend using structural equation modeling methods to test for a mediator 
effect. In the present study, moral climate is a suspected mediator variable and its 
potential mediator effects were tested on the relationship between moral sensitivity and 
moral reasoning. 
A moderator effect occurs when the suspected moderating variable influences the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). A moderator is the interaction of the two main effects (independent 
variable x moderator variable), and a moderator effect occurs when the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable changes as a function of the 
level of the moderator variable. Baron and Kenny recommend using a hierarchical 
regression procedure to test for moderator effects by adding the moderator term to the 
regression equation. First, a moderator term is created by computing the product of the 
standardized scores of the independent variable and the suspected moderator variable. In 
the present study, moral sensitivity x moral climate was tested as the moderator term. 
Then a hierarchical regression is used to test if the moderator term is significant and adds 
a meaningful proportion of variance explained above and beyond the independent 
variable and the suspected moderator variable. That is, in hierarchical regression, the 
independent variable is entered on block one, the suspected moderator variable is entered 
on block two, and the moderator term is entered on block three. A moderator effect 
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occurs when the moderator term adds a meaningful proportion of variance explained to 
the overall model. 
Moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, was first 
investigated to determine if it mediated or moderated the relationship between cognitive 
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured N2 and U score. To test whether a mediator 
or a moderator effect may exist, a statistically significant relationship between cognitive 
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and U score must first be demonstrated 
(see Figure 3). 
Cognitive 
Empathy 
.o9 <R2 = .01) 
N2 
i.o <R2 = .99) 
.12 <R2 =.on 
U score 
Figure 3. Determining if there is a significant relationship between cognitive empathy 
and moral reasoning after age and supervision valence removed. Unstandardized 
Solution. 
The model in Figure 3 was supported,/ (1, N = 52) = 0.23 (p = .63), CFI = 0.56, 
AIC = -1. 77, and did not represent a good fit nor reveal a significant relationship between 
cognitive empathy and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and U scores. As the first 
criteria for testing for a mediator effect was not met, that the independent and dependent 
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variable correlate, moral climate was not tested for a mediator effect on the relationship 
between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning. 
To test if moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, may be 
moderating the relationship between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning, a 
hierarchical regression was used to predict the N2 score. Age and supervision valence 
rating (positive or negative) were used as covariates in block one, cognitive empathy was 
entered on block two, moral climate (role conflicts and ambiguities) was entered on block 
three, and the moderator term (cognitive empathy*moral climate) was entered on block 
four. Regression results are presented in Table 9 and the coefficients are presented in 
Table 10. The full model accounted for 19% (AdjustedR2 = 10%) of the variance in the 
N2 score (see Table 9). The moderator term, cognitive empathy*moral climate, 
explained 6% of the variance above and beyond the rest of the model and approached 
statistical significance (p = . 07). This is a meaningful finding given the low power 
inherent in such a small sample, and it is likely that in a larger sample this moderator 
would be statistically significant. This finding indicates that moral climate, as measured 
by role conflicts and ambiguities, moderates the relationship between cognitive empathy 
and moral reasoning. Figure 4 presents the moderator effect of moral climate. As can be 
seen in Figure 4, there is more variance in N2 scores at higher levels of moral climate 
(role conflicts and ambiguities). When students perceive role conflicts and ambiguities in 
their supervision experience, moral reasoning is not positively impacted. At higher levels 
of role conflicts and ambiguities it is not possible to predict moral reasoning. 
An examination of the standardized beta weights in Table· l 0, reveals that the 
moderator term is a significant predictor of the N2 score (beta= -.25,p = .07). The 
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hypothesis that moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, mediates 
the relationship between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning was not supported; it 
appears that it moderates this relationship. 
Table 9 
Testing for Moderator Effect of Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities) on 
Cognitive Emp_athy__ and Moral Reasoning 
Ri Adjusted. F Sig. F 
Model R If 
R2 Change Change Change 
Age, Supervision 
l .30 .09 .05 2.45 .10 
Valence 
2 Cognitive Empathy .31 .10 .04 .006 .30 .59 
Moral Climate (Role 
3 Conflicts and .35 .13 .05 .03 1.53 .22 
Ambiguities) 
Moderator (Cognitive 
4 Empathy*Moral .43 .19 .10 .06 3.49 .07 
Climate) 
Table 10 
Coefficients for Testing for Moderator Effect of Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and 










Age .13 .85 .40 .22 .12 .12 
1 
Supervision 
-.23 -1.53 .13 -.28 -.21 -.21 
Valence 
Age .12 .82 .42 .22 .. 12 .11 
2 
Supervision 
-.24 -1.56 .13 -.28 -.22 -.21 
Valence 
Cognitive Empathy .08 .54 .59 .06 .08 .08 
Age .14 .91 .38 .22 .13 .12 
Supervision 
-.07 -.33 .74 -.28 -.05 -.05 
Valence 
3 Cognitive Empathy .07 .53 .60 .06 .08 .07 
Moral Climate 
(Role Conflicts and -.23 -1.24 .22 -.31 -.18 -.17 
Ambiguities) 
Age .17 1.15 .26 .22 .17 .15 
Supervision 
-.10 -.50 .62 -.28 -.07 -.07 
Valence 
Cognitive Empathy .09 .68 .50 .06 .10 .09 
4 Moral Climate 
(Role Conflicts and -.20 -1.06 .30 -.31 -.15 -.14 
Ambiguities) 
Cognitive 
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Figure 4. Interaction plot for Cognitive Empathy*Moral Climate 
Moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, was next 
investigated to determine if it mediated or moderated the relationship between affective 
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured N2 and U scores. To test whether a mediator 
or a moderator effect may exist, a statistically significant relationship between affective 
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and U score must first be demonstrated 
(see Figure 5). 
Affective 
Empathy 
.37* (k = .14) 




Figure 5. Establishing a significant relationship between affective empathy and moral 
reasoning after removing age and supervision valence. Unstandardized Solution. * p :S 
.01 
The model in Figure 5 was supported, I (1, N = 52) = .69 (p = .41), CFI = 1.00, 
AIC = -1.31, establishing a significant relationship between affective empathy and moral 
reasoning (R = .37), as measured by N2 and U scores. The first criteria for testing for a 
mediator effect are met. From this model, moral climate was entered to test for a 
mediator effect (see Figure 6). 
Affective 
Empathy 
-.13 <R2 = .02) 
.35* <R2 = .13) 
-.13 <R2 = .02) 






.12 <R2 =.on 
Figure 6. Testing if moral climate mediates the relationship between affective empathy 
and moral reasoning after age and supervision valence removed. Unstandardized 
Solution. * p :S .01 
Although the model presented in Figure 6 was supported,/ (2, N = 52) = 0.80 (p 
= .67), CFI = 1.00, AIC = -3.20, the relationship between affective empathy and moral 
reasoning remains statistically significant (R = .35), thus moral climate does not mediate 
this relationship. The addition of moral climate to the model only marginally impacted 
the relationship between affective empathy and moral reasoning; without moral climate 
in the model affective empathy accounted for 14 % of the variance in moral reasoning and 
with moral climate added to the model affective empathy accounted for 13% of the 
variance in moral reasoning. The pathway from affective empathy to moral reasoning 
was removed to test the fit of the model (Figure 7). The removal ofthis pathway resulted 
in a model that was not supported, i (3, N = 52) = 7.66 (p = .05), CFI = .04, AIC = 1.66. 
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Table 11 presents a comparison of the models for testing whether moral climate mediates 
the relationship between affective empathy and moral reasoning. 
Affective 
Empathy 
-.13 (.R2 = .01) 
1.0 (.R2 = .99) 
.12 (R2 = 
.01) 






Figure 7. Removal of pathway from affective empathy and moral reasoning after age 
and supervision valence removed. Unstandardized Solution. * p :::; .10 
Table 11 
Model Comparisons testing whether Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities) 
mediates the relationship between Affective Empathy and Moral Reasoning after age and 
supervision valence removed 
Model Scale i DJ p CF! AJC 
Testing the relationship between Affective 
Empathy & Moral Reasoning (Figure 5) 
Add Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and 
Ambiguities) to Model (Figure 6) 
Remove pathway between Affective 




1 .41 1.00 -1.31 
2 .67 1.00 -3.20 
3 .05 .04 1.66 
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Using the CFI and AIC criteria (see Table 11), the model presented in Figure 6 is 
best supported; indicating both affective empathy and moral climate influence moral 
reasoning, and that moral climate does not mediate the relationship between affective 
empathy and moral reasoning. However, this does not detennine whethe~ moral climate 
moderates the relationship between affective empathy and moral reasoning. A 
hierarchical regression was run to see if moral climate moderates the relationship 
between affective empathy and moral reasoning. Age and supervision valence rating 
(positive or negative) were used as covariates in block one, affective empathy was 
entered on block two, moral climate was entered on block three, and the moderator term 
(affective empathy*moral climate) was entered on block four. Regression results are 
presented in Table 12 and the coefficients are presented in Table 13. As seen in Table 
12, the overall model accounted for 23.9% (Adjusted R2 = 15.6%) of the variance in the 
N2 score. The moderator term explained . 9% of the variance above and beyond the rest 
of the model and was not statistically significant (p = .45). Only the addition of affective 
empathy to this model was statistically significant, explaining 12.4% of the variance in 
the N2 score. 
An examination of the standardized beta weights in Table 13 reveals that 
affective empathy is a significant predictor of the N2 score (beta= .34). Moral Climate, 
as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, does not mediate or moderate the 
relationship between affectiye empathy and moral reasoning. Although the relationship 
between affective empathy and moral reasoning is not mediated or moderated by moral 
climate, overall the total model accounts for a meaningful proportion of variance in moral 
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reasoning, thus the impact of affective empathy and moral climate on moral reasoning 
can not be discounted. 
Table 12 
Testing/or Moderator Effect of Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities) on the 
relationshi between A ective Em ath and Moral Reasoning 
Adjusted F Sig. F 
Model R If 
R1 Change Change Change 
Age, Supervision 
1 .30 .09 .05 2.45 .10 
Valence 
2 Affective Empathy .46 .22 .17 .12 7.59 .008 
Moral Climate (Role 
3 Conflicts and .48 .23 .17 .02 .95 .34 
Ambiguities) 
Moderator (Affective 




Coefficients for Testing for Moderator Effect of Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and 











.13 .85 .40 .22 .12 .12 
1 
Supervision -.23 -1.53 .13 -.28 -.21 -.21 
Valence 
Age 
.12 .82 .42 .22 .12 .11 
2 Supervision -.30 .. 2.12 .04 -.28 -.29 -.27 
Valence 
Affective Empathy 
.36 2.75 .008 .30 .37 .35 
Age 
.13 .89 .38 .22 .13 .11 




.34 2.60 .01 .30 .36 .33 
Moral Climate 
-.17 -.97 .34 -.31 -.14 -.12 
(Role Conflicts 
and Ambiguities 2 
Age 
.13 .91 .37 .22 .13 .12 
Supervision -.13 -.66 .51 -.28 -.10 -.09 
Valence 
Affective Empathy 
.27 1.57 .12 .30 .23 .20 
4 
Moral Climate 
(Role Conflicts -.21 -1.12 .27 -.31 -.16 -.14 
and Ambiguities) 
Affective 
-.12 -.73 .47 -.26 -.11 -.09 
Empathy*Moral 
Climate 
The relationships between the constructs of moral sensitivity, as measured by 
affective empathy and cognitive empathy, and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and 
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U scores, were examined next (see Figure 8). This model was supported, x..2 (1, N = 52) = 
1.71 (p = .19), CFI = 0.96, AIC = -.29. Moral sensitivity positively correlated with moral 
reasoning (R = .37). Both error terms for N2 and affective empathy were constrained at 
the lower bound. The error terms for N2 and affective empathy were set at E = 0.01 as 
shown in Figure 9. Relaxing the error terms for N2 and affective empathy also resulted 
in a supported model, x..2 (3, N = 52) = 1.75 (p = .62), CFI = 1.00, AIC = -4.25. 
According to the CFI and AIC criteria, the adjusted model resulted in a better fit; 
although at the measurement level the constructs are not cohesive due the variation in 
magnitude of each measured variable with the construct. No further post hoc adjustments 





1.0 <R2 = .99) 
.52* <R2 = .27) 
N2 Score 
1.0 <R2 = .99) 
.37* <R2 = .14) 
U Score 
Figure 8. Testing if Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning are significantly related after 






i.o <R2 = .99) 
.37* (R2 = .14) 
.52** <R2 = .27) 
E = 0.01 
N2 Score 
1.0 <R2 = .99*) 
.14 <R2 = .02) 
U Score 
Figure 9. Model adjusted for constraints. Unstandardized solution. * p :S .005, ** p :S 
.001 
To test if the moral climate may mediate this relationship, a significant 
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relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning first needed to be established; 
this finding is presented in Figure 9, revealing that moral sensitivity is.positively 
correlated with moral reasoning (R = .37). The criterion to test for a mediator effect is 
met. From this model, moral climate was entered to test whether it mediated the 
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.12 <If= .on 
Figure 10. Testing Moral Climate Mediator Effect between Moral Sensitivity and Moral 
Reasoning after removing age and supervision valence. Unstandardized Solution. * p :::::; 
.005, ** p:::::; .001 
The model presented in Figure 10 was supported, i' (5, N = 52) = 1.98 (p = .85), 
CFI = 1.00, AIC = -8.02. No post hoc adjustments were made to this model. As the 
pathway between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning remains significant and moral 
sensitivity remains meaningfully related (R = .36) to moral reasoning, moral climate does 
not mediate this relationship. The fit of the model with the pathway between moral 








1.0 <R2 = .99) 
-.13 (R2 = .02) 
E=0.01 
N2 Score 
-.18 CR!= .03) 
Moral Climate (Role 
Conflicts and 
Ambiguities) 
.12 <R2 = .01) 
Figure 11. Pathway between Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning removed. 
Unstandardized Solution. * p ~ .005 
80 
The model presented in Figure 11 was also supported, i' (6, N = 52) = 8.81, (p = 
.18), CFI = .84, AIC = -3.20; however moral sensitivity is not correlated with moral 
climate and moral climate is not correlated with moral reasoning. Table 14 presents a 
comparison of the models for testing whether moral climate mediates the relationship 
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Using the CFI and AIC criteria (see 
Table 14 ), the model presented in Figure 10 is the best supported, indicating that both 
moral sensitivity and moral climate impact moral reasoning, and that moral climate does 
not mediate the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. However, 
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this does not determine whether the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning is moderated by moral climate. 
Table 14 
Model Comparisons testing whether Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities) 
mediates the relationship between Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning after age and 
supervision valence removed 
Model Scale/ DJ p CF! AIC 
Testing the-relationship between Moral 
1.71 1 .19 .96 -.29 
Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning (Figure 8) 
Relax error constraints for N2 and Affective 
1.75 3 .62 1.00 -4.25 
Empathy (Figure 9) 
Add Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and 
1.98 5 .85 1.00 -8.02 
Ambiguities) to Model (Figure 10) 
Remove pathway between Moral Sensitivity 
8.81 6 .18 .84 -3.20 
and Moral Reasoning (Figure 11) 
To test if moral climate may be moderating the relationship between moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning, a hierarchical regression was used to predict the N2 
score. Age and supervision valence rating (positive or negative) were used as covariates 
in block one, total empathy score was entered on block two, moral climate (role conflicts 
and ambiguities) was entered on block three, and the moderator term (total 
empathy*moral climate) was entered on block four. Regression results are presented in 
Table 15 and the coefficients are presented in Table 16. As seen in Table 15, the full 
model accounted for 24% (Adjustedk= 15%) of the variance in the N2 score. The 
moderator term explained 5% of the variance above and beyond the rest of the model and 
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was approached statistical significance (p = .08). This is a meaningful finding given the 
low power of the small sample; and the moderator may be statistically significant in a 
larger sample. 
An examination of the standardized beta weights in Table 16, reveals that the 
moderator term, total empathy*moral climate, is the strongest predictor of the N2 score in 
the final model and approaches statistical significance (beta= -.24,p = .08). 
Table 15 
Testing for Moderator Effect of Moral Climate (Role Conflict and Ambiguities) on Moral 
Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning 
Adjusted ii1 F Sig. F 
Model R If 
If Change Change Change 
1 Age, Supervision Valence 
.30 .09 .05 2.45 .10 
2 Total Empathy 
.40 .16 .11 .07 4.15 .05 
Moral Climate (Role 
.43 .18 .12 .02 1.22 .28 
3 Conflicts and Ambiguities) 
4 Moderator (Total 
.49 .24 .15 .05 3.14 .08 
Em~athy*Moral Climate) 
Figure 12 presents the moderator effect of moral climate on the relationship 
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. As can be seen in Figure 12, there is 
more variance in N2 scores at higher levels of role conflicts and ambi~ities. When 
students perceive role conflicts and ambiguities in their supervision experience moral 
reasoning is not positively impacted. At higher levels of role conflicts and ambiguities it 
is not possible to predict moral reasoning. 
Table 16 
Coefficients for Testing/or Moderator Effect of Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and 










Age .13 .85 .40 .22 .12 .12 
Supervision 
-.23 -1.53 .13 -.28 -.21 -.21 
Valence 
Age .16 .80 .43 .22 .11 .11 
2 Supervision 
-.28 -1.90 .06 -.28 -.26 -.25 
Valence 
Total Empathy .27 2.04 .05 .22 .28 .27 
Age .13 .88 .39 .22 .13 .12 
Supervision 
-.13 -.66 .51 -.28 -.10 -.09 
Valence 
3 
Total Empathy .26 1.93 .06 .22 .27 .26 
Moral Climate 
(Role Conflicts -.20 -1.10 .28 -.31 -.16 -.15 
and Ambiguities 2 
Age .15 1.04 .31 .22 .15 .13 
Supervision 
-.10 -.53 .60 -.28 -.08 -.07 
Valence 
4 
Total Empathy .17 1.24 .22 .22 .18 .16 
Moral Climate 
(Role Conflicts -.22 -1.23 .23 -.31 -.18 -.16 
and Ambiguities) 
Empathy*Moral 
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Figure 12. Interaction plot for Total Empathy*Moral Climate 
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The hypothesis that moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, 
moderates the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning is supported. 
Discussion 
The impact of moral climate on two components of Rest's Four Component 
Model of Moral Behavior, moral sensitivity and moral reasoning, was investigated. After 
controlling for age and supervision valence, moral sensitivity, as measured by affective 
empathy and cognitive empathy, is significantly correlated with moral reasoning, as 
measured by N2 and U scores. It is likely that affective empathy is most important in 
describing this relationship, as affective empathy and moral reasoning were neither 
mediated nor moderated by moral climate. Thus, psychology graduate students' affective 
empathy skills directly impact their level of moral reasoning regardless of the moral 
climate. However, the relationship between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning is 
moderated by moral climate. In this case, a negative moral climate, defined as role 
conflict and ambiguities in clinical supervision, interacts with poor perspective taking and 
increased personal distress (cognitive empathy) to adversely impact moral reasoning. 
These findings have both theoretical and applied implications. 
For the moral reasoning process to be initiated, a moral schema must be activated 
via moral sensitivity. Affective empathy alone is sufficient to initiate moral reasoning; 
however, cognitive empathy alone is not sufficient to initiate moral reasoning. That is, 
cognitive empathy interacts with the moral climate to cue and impact the level of moral 
reasoning. For example, an immature empathic response may be taking another's 
perspective until personal distress is experienced. At the point of personal distress, the 
empathy process may shut down and thereby circumvent the moral reasoning process. 
By distancing oneself from the dilemma to avoid an emotional reaction, one's moral 
schema may not be activated and thus the moral reasoning process 
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is not initiated. Alternatively, a lack of an affective empathy response may potentially 
reduce the level of moral reasoning due to the interplay of emotion and cognition in the 
reasoning process (Damasio, 1994 ). Supervision experiences may assist students to 
become aware of cognitive and emotional responses to moral and interpersonal dilemmas 
so that they can work on self-regulation during interactions with psychotherapy clients. 
These results support the components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning as 
distinct yet related. Rest has hypothesized that many facets make up each of the 
components in his Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, and that various facets 
should be studied in isolation to gain an empirical understanding of how the components 
relate to each other. The present study isolated the facet of empathy, cognitive and 
affective, in the component of moral sensitivity. Despite a strong correlation between 
affective empathy and cognitive empathy, these two empathic response styles impacted 
moral reasoning differently. This speaks to the importance of adequately assessing 
numerous facets of each component to understand fully the dynamics of the relationships 
between the components. Additionally, cognitive empathy interacts with moral climate 
to cue the moral reasoning process; pointing to the importance of the dynamic interplay 
of four components. It is not only important to break-down variables that make up each 
of the four components, but also to investigate other intrinsic or extrinsic factors that 
could mediate or moderate these relationships (Bebeau, 2002; Rest & Narvaez, 1994; 
Rest & Narvaez, 1998; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Walker, 2002). These 
findings support continued research into the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, 
in addition to the examination of mechanisms that influence the relationships among the 
components. 
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These findings can be employed to determine important components in clinical 
psychologists. Historically, psychologists have been trained to deal with clients on a 
cognitive level; that is, to be able to take the clients' perspective to understand the clients' 
distress. The present findings reveal that cognitive empathy alone is not a precursor to 
moral reasoning during training and that personal distress during perspective taking may 
in fact turn off the moral reasoning process. Clinical supervision needs to alert students 
to the importance of understanding their own emotional responses to clients and how this 
impacts both the therapeutic and supervision experience. Through experiences in clinical 
supervision students can learn to self-regulate both affective and cognitive responses to 
potential moral dilemmas to be able to facilitate higher levels of moral reasoning when 
faced with an ethical dilemma. Eisenberg (2000}, Hoffman (2000), and Pizarro (2000) 
stress the importance of effectively managing both types of empathic responses, as over 
or under-arousal hinders moral reasoning. In open and supportive supervision 
environments, students may feel safe discussing their empathic responses and potential 
difficulties in perspective taking and distress. Additionally, supervision experiences may 
assist the student to understand and accept that acting morally does not always feel good, 
but that to avoid moral action in the hope of avoiding negative feelings is unethical and 
irresponsible. This open discussion during supervision may lead to self-awareness of 
moral schema activation and advance the moral reasoning process. 
Supervision experience provides the opportunity for students to realize that being 
empathic, either affectively or cognitively, and effectively managing their empathic 
responses leads to advanced decision making skills. Supervision allows for the 
opportunity to discuss any vicarious trauma or uncomfortable emotions that the student 
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may experience as a result of interaction with clients, to learn that such responses are 
normal and to effectively cope with such responses. Additionally, students may also 
learn that being empathic does not mean that one is at risk of losing control. That is, an 
empathic response must be effectively regulated to avoid over or under-arousal while 
allowing for a full understanding of the depths of the clients' experience while knowing 
that these are not one's own personal emotions or experiences. 
Effective moral reasoning may be blocked by a number of factors, including 
prejudice, racism, stereotypes, poor ego-defenses or authoritarianism (Puka, 2002), all of 
which have cognitive and emotional components. Puka suggests that by only attempting 
to improve moral reasoning without directly addressing potential obstacles to moral 
development negates the difficulties one experiences in becoming aware of and in 
challenging their moral schema in order to develop more advanced moral reasoning 
skills. Quality clinical supervision may assist students' to become aware of personal 
biases and assist in challenging these biases to improve awareness of dilemmas and moral 
reasoning. Prior research has found that open academic environments and supervision 
experiences help students to analyze and challenge their belief systems, thus fostering 
moral development, while closed academic environments and supervision experiences do 
not lead to gains in moral reasoning (Bebeau, 2002; Collinson, 2001; Good & Cartwright, 
1998; Clarkeburn, Downie, & Matthew, 2002; Morton et al, 2001 ). The present study 
partially supports these prior findings, indicating that in supervision experiences in which 
students perceive role conflicts and ambiguities moral reasoning was not consistently 
improved. The students' perception of their clinical supervision impacts whether or not 
their personal impediments to advancement in moral reasoning are addressed or not. The 
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role of mentor or supervisor includes assisting students to analyze information, reason 
critically, and implement decision making (Collinson, 2001~ Clarkebum, et al, 2002). 
Morton et al (2000) found that prolonged clinical experiences in medical students 
provided the opportunity for development of postformal operations. Through such 
activities, that incorporate both cognitive and affective demands, students become aware 
of their moral schemas which may then promote advanced moral reasoning. 
The 'hidden curriculum' (Bebeau, 2002; Collinson, 2001; Good & Cartwright, 
1998; Clarkebum, et al, 2002; Morton, et al, 2001) in professional training is an obstacle 
to moral development. In such curriculums students are not encouraged to ask questions, 
disagree with supervisors, show any sign of vulnerability for fear of being labeled as 
weak or unprofessional, and are unaware of how they will be evaluated. A moral climate 
that promotes a 'hidden curriculum' does not encourage or support students' efforts to 
become aware of or challenge their moral schema to advance moral reasoning. In fact, a 
'hidden curriculum' environment fosters conventional (maintaining norms, rule-based) 
reasoning, such that students are expected to follow the unwritten rules without question, 
to not challenge their supervisors, and to not put the client needs ahead of personal or 
institutional needs. In such environments, perspective taking and affective responses to 
clients are discouraged; skills that are necessary to advance beyond conventional 
reasoning. That is, 'hidden curriculum' environments do not encourage or promote 
postconventional (creating norms) moral schemas or reasoning. 
Perceptions of the moral climate impact one's moral sensitivity and its 
relationship to moral reasoning. The present study did not find that moral climate 
mediates the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. That is, moral 
climate does not account for the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning. However, moral climate did moderate the relationship between moral 
sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, and moral reasoning. When students 
perceived low levels of role conflicts and ambiguities in their moral climate, moral 
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. sensitivity and moral reasoning were associated; however, at higher levels of role 
conflicts and ambiguities a consistent relationship between moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning was not found. This finding has implications for the development of moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning. Students who perceive a moral climate in which their 
supervision experiences include role conflicts and ambiguities, may be at risk for less 
development of moral sensitivity that cues one's awareness of the subtle dilemmas 
encountered in the intimacy of a therapeutic setting. In such settings, students may be 
aware of explicit ethical violations as described in the ethics code; however, they may not 
have developed the skills necessary to move beyond interpreting the ethics code from a 
conventional (rule-based) perspective to a postconventional (creating norms) perspective. 
Thus, moral schema activation may only occur in situations in which the student is aware 
of explicit ethical violations. This lack of sensitivity for subtle or implicit ethical 
dilemmas leaves the student vulnerable to engage in unethical behavior when faced with 
a morally ambiguous situation. Potential unethical behavior may not be initially 
recognized as such; however, over time there is the potential for unethical behavior to 
increase and become more explicit (i.e., scheduling a client as the last appointment in 
order to spend more time with them, arranging to meet a client outside of the therapy 
session, etc.). If the student experienced role conflicts and ambiguities during their 
supervision experience, their moral sensitivity may not be activated until after explicit 
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ethical violations have occurred as their training did not sufficiently address their lack of 
sensitivity to subtle ethical dilemmas. 
There are important study limitations that need to be addressed before drawing 
conclusions from these data. One main limitation is low power due to a small sample 
size and therefore an underestimation of the effects of affective and cognitive empathy on 
moral reasoning. Additionally, the use of two covariates, age and supervision valance, 
further decreased the power of the analyses. However, despite the low power, the 
moderation effect of moral climate in the cognitive empathy and moral reasoning 
relationship approached significance providing a meaningful effect. Because the 
moderator term approaches significance with such low power, this may be an interesting 
avenue to pursue in further study. 
Another study limitation was the degree of bias in the moral climate measure. 
After controlling for age, group differences were noted between subjects who rated a 
positive versus negative supervision experience on the measure of moral climate (role 
conflicts and ambiguities). Although the study instructed participants to indicate if they 
chose to rate a positive or a negative supervision experience, this rating was not 
accounted for in the original plan for data analyses. The study asked participants to 
choose a supervision experience that had a significant impact on them. In the future, 
those who rate a positive versus negative experience should be analyzed separately. 
Given our small sample size, these two groups were collapsed. These differences were 
controlled for by using age and supervision valence as covariates; however, separate 
analyses on positive and negative raters could focus the examination to determine the 
dynamics of the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning for different 
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groups. Future research should account for differences in supervision valence ratings; 
either through group comparison and/or by having subjects rate both a positive and 
negative supervision experience to understand the differential impact on moral reasoning 
within persons. Group comparison may be the more desirable alternative, otherwise 
people would have to have had two different supervision experiences in order to meet 
inclusion criteria. 
Another study limitation was the operationalization of moral climate. King and 
Mayhew (2002) recommend that moral climate be assessed using specific indicators 
rather than global indicators (such as academic program). The present study attempted to 
specify the moral climate using students' perceptions of a clinical experience and the 
emotional support within their academic environment. The use of the nurturance scale 
did not meet expectations, and was dropped from all analyses, leaving the role conflicts 
and ambiguities scale as the only measure of moral climate. The nurturance scale 
assessed perceptions of support from their academic institution in general while the role 
conflicts and ambiguities scale assessed perceptions of their experience with a clinical 
supervisor. In the final analyses only the measure of perceptions of an individual 
relationship was retained because nurturance was unrelated to moral reasoning. 
However, students' training and development is not only impacted by their one-on-one 
relationships with clinical supervisors and mentors, but also with their academic 
department and the institution as a whole. A more adequate measure of the moral climate 
in future research could address both one-on-one relationships with clinical supervisors 
and mentors and the students' perceptions of their overall academic environment. Future 
research needs to adequately assess not only clinical supervision experiences but also the 
milieu of the academic experience in its entirety. To do this while also gaining a high 
response rate to a lengthy measure will be difficult. 
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Two components of Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, moral 
sensitivity and moral reasoning, were influence by moral climate. During psychological 
training, cognitive empathy alone is insufficient to cue moral reasoning and must interact 
with the moral climate in order to cue the moral reasoning process. These findings 
address the importance the moral climate in fostering moral sensitivity and moral 
development. Specifically, ambiguous or 'hidden curriculum' environments impede 
moral sensitivity and moral development. If perspective taking is not moderated by the 
supervision environment, it may lead to the experience of personal distress which 
interferes with moral reasoning. Confusion and ambiguity in supervision experiences 
deters students from learning to recognize the day-to-day moral dilemmas they encounter, 
and does not encourage perspective taking and emotional regulation that fosters moral 
reasoning. Additionally, when students experience ambiguity or conflict in clinical 
supervision they are not provided with the opportunity to understand that they do not 
have to take on the emotional distress that a client experiences to act as moral agents or 
as therapists. Students need to learn effective self-regulations skills, for both affective 
and cognitive empathic responses, to avoid over or under-arousal and to understand how 
their empathic response style influences their moral reasoning. 
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Appendix A: Recruitment Flyer 
DECISION-MAKING & PROFESSIONAL SOC/ALIZA TION 
Loma Linda University 
Have you ever wondered how your psychological training 
has influenced your DECISION-MAKING, both 
PROFESSIONALLY & SOC/ALLY? 
Those enrolled in Graduate Clinical Psychology Programs 
& who have Clinical Experience are invited to participate 
in an LLU thesis research study on 
DECISION-MAK/NG & PROFESSIONAL SOC/ALIZA TION 
The study will examine the impact of academic and professional training on decision-
making processes. Given that psychologists strive to help clients within an interpersonal 
context, it is important to determine how interpersonal decision-making develops during 
psychological training. All responses will be anonymous. There will be no cost to you, 
other than 1 hour of your time to fill out the DECISION-MAKING SURVEY. 
Studv oarticipants can enter a raffle to win one of 
two $50 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com! 
If you'd like to participate or more information, please 
contact 
Marita Mahoney at (909) 558-8165 or 
mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu. You may also contact the 
research study supervisor at kmorton@univ.llu.edu. 
We look forward to hearing from you! 
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Appendix B: Informed Consent 
October 14, 2002 
Dear 
My name is Marita Mahoney and I am currently enrolled in the Psychology Ph.D. 
program at Loma Linda University. I am conducting the current project for my Master's thesis 
requirement. I am interested in studying how our training experiences influence our decision-
making in interpersonal situations. You recently received a flyer regarding this study in your 
student mailbox and have volunteered to participate. I am inviting you, a graduate student in 
Clinical Psychology, to complete the enclosed survey about the impact of your training 
experiences on decision-making in emotional and interpersonal situations. Your responses will 
assist in understanding how graduate psychology students make decisions. 
This study will examine the impact of student perceptions of their academic and 
professional training on their decision-making process. As psychologists-in-training, we will be 
faced with a variety of ethical and ambiguous situations; it is important for our training to prepare 
us to effectively and actively manage these situations. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
examining this relationship in psychological training. Given that psychologists strive to help and 
not harm their clients, it is necessary and beneficial to study how decisions are made in the 
context of interpersonal relationships. 
The survey will take approximately one hour to complete, and it requires attention and 
concentration, as the items ask you to demonstrate your decision-making process on five 
vignettes. The risks are minimal, no greater than those encountered when you reason about 
dilemmas in your everyday life. Your participation is voluntary, there is no penalty for not 
participating and you can choose to withdraw at any time. As a fellow graduate student, I fully 
understand that this is a lot of time to ask you to put aside to complete this survey. Yet, I believe 
that the information this study will provide to psychology programs and what you learn about 
yourself in the process may be very enlightening. As competent and effective future 
psychologists, it is important for us to know how we react interpersonal situations. Your 
department will receive the results from the overall study. For your participation in this study 
you are offered a chance to win one of two $50.00 Gift Certificates from Amazon.com. Just fill 
out the enclosed pre-stamped postcard with you name and contact information and mail it 
separately from the survey. At the conclusion of this study, two postcards will be randomly 
drawn to each receive one Gift Certificate. 
With this in mind, and the knowledge that everything you answer here is anonymous, I 
hope that you will decide to complete this survey and return it to us in the Psychology 
Department at Loma Linda University. All information will be number-coded and you should not 
write your name on the survey. Please take the time right now to complete this survey, insert it 
into the self-addressed, stamped envelope provided and mail it to us. 
If you have any questions about this project, please do not hesitate to contact, myself, 
Marita Mahoney at (909) 558-8165 or mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu, or Dr. Kelly Morton, 
Research Committee Chair, at (909) 558-8165. You may also contact an impartial third party not 
involved with this study at (909) 558-4647 with any concerns about this project. 
Thank you in advance for you time and cooperation in this important project. 
Sincerely, 
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A., 
Psychology Doctoral Student 
Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Research Supervisor 
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Appendix C: Survey 
®~cision Making 
and 
Prof ~ssional ~ocialization 
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A. 
Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
Loma Linda University 
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Decision Making & Professional Socialization 
Loma Linda University · 
Department of Psychology 
Surveyinstructions & how to enter the raffle 
Please fill out all parts of the sutVey - at a convenient time for you. 
Part L· on the Defining Issues Test-2 you will rate your values & priorities in 
interpersonal decision-making. The questions are challenging & thought 
provoking! The DIT-2 has 2 parts - Instructions & an Answer Sheet. It is printed 
in red ink, & takes most people about 30 minutes. 
Part //includes questions about your academic & professional 
training. It is printed on yellow paper, & will take about 10 minutes. 
Return Parts I & //in the addressed stamped envelope without bending or 
folding the materials! 
Now comes the fun part! 
Enter a raffle to win 1of2 $50.00 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com!!! 
Take 20 seconds to fill in your telephone# or email on the addressed stamped 
postcard so we can contact you if you win. 
To ensure survey anonymity, please return the postcard separatelvtrom 
the survey materials. 
Thanks for your participation!! We hope that you've learned something about 
yourself & your professional development. If you have any questions, please do 
not hesitate to contact Marita Mahoney at (909) 558-8165 or 
mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu, or Dr. Kelly Morton, Thesis Committee Chair, at (909) 
558-8165. 
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A. 
Psychology Doctoral Student 
Loma Linda University 
Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D., 
Associate Professor, Research 
Supervisor 
Loma Linda University 
Don't forget to return the raffle postcard for vour chance to win!!!! 
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Please tell us a little about yourself. Please darken the circle that best represents 
your answer. 
1. What Graduate psycholo2v proeram are you currendy enrolled in? 
M.A. M.S. Psy.D. Ph.D. Other: 
0 0 0 0 0 
la. Please indicate program type: 
Clinical Experimental 
0 0 
lb. What year of the Graduate Psycholof!Y pro2ram are you currently in? 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Other 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2. What deerees have you completed? 
B.A/B.S. M.F.T. M.D. J.D. Masters (specify program): Doctorate (specify program): 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Please list any professional licenses that you hold: 
4. Please list any professional &/or student affiliations that you are a member of: 
5. Please indicate how many professional poster &/or paper 
presentations you have been an author on: 
6. I Please indicate the number of publications you have been an 
author on: 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and 
Cl.> Cl.> 
feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how Cl.> e .Q. 
~ e ·c rs -; c:.J well it describes you by darkening the appropriate circle. Read 0 Cl.> .Q. .c rJ-z :9 ·c: ~ "C -each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as you !j b = c:.J Cl.> ~ = fn Cl.> r; e ~ OJ can. Q -8 ~ Q ~ ~ e 
7. I daydream & fantasize, with some regularity, about things 
0 0 0 0 0 that might happen to me. 
8. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 0 0 0 0 0 fortunate than me. 
9. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other 0 0 0 0 0 euy's" point of view. 
10. Sometimes I do not feel sorry for people when they are 0 0 0 0 0 havine problems. 
11. I really get involved with the feelings of characters in a 0 0 0 0 0 novel 
12. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive & ill at ease. 0 0 0 0 0 
13. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, & I do 0 0 0 0 0 not often 2et completely cauaht up in it. 
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The following statements inquire about your thoughts and ~ 
Q,) 
e 
feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how ~ Q,) 
Q,) 
Q,) e ,.Q 
E-oe e ·c: well it describes you by darkening the appropriate circle. Read rlJ ~ (j 0 Q,) .8-= rlJ z~ Q,) each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as you ·c ~ "C 
~ ~ 
(j Q,) rs -can. ~ § Q'QJ Q -8 Q rlJ Q ~ 
14. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I 0 0 0 0 0 make a decision. 
15. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of 0 0 0 0 0 protective of him or her. 
16. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very 0 0 0 0 0 emotional situation. 
17. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 0 0 0 0 0 imaginina how things look from their perspective. 
18. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is 0 0 0 0 0 extremely rare for me. 
19. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 0 0 0 0 0 
20. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a 0 0 0 0 0 2reat deal. 
21. If I am sure I am right about something, I do not waste 
0 0 0 0 0 much time listening to other people's arguments. 
22. After seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were 0 0 0 0 0 one of the characters. 
23. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 0 0 0 0 0 
24. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes do 0 0 0 0 0 not feel very much pity for him or her. 
25. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. 0 0 0 0 0 
26. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 0 0 0 0 0 
27. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try 0 0 0 0 0 to look at both of them. 
28. I would describe myself as a pretty softhearted person. 0 0 0 0 0 
29. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in 0 0 0 0 0 the place of a leadin2 character. 
30. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 0 0 0 0 0 
31. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in 0 0 0 0 0 their shoes" for a while. 
32. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine 
how I would feel if the events in the story were happening 0 0 0 0 0 
tome. 
33. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, 0 0 0 0 0 
I eo to pieces. 
34. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would 0 0 0 0 0 feel if I were in their place. 
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:; 
~ ~~ fll ~ 
lnd~cate how well each statement describes your perception of the = '-"' e --~ ~ .... .i ""~ 
Psychology Department at this institution by darkening the c.;;;..i az 
~~ e v.i ts 
appropriate circle. Q = 
~~ 
fll ~ .= 0 fll c. .... c. 
~e -= «S ~ -= 
35. The faculty is reserved & distant toward me. 0 0 0 0 0 
36. This department takes an interest in my personal welfare. 0 0 0 0 0 
37. When giving criticism or answering a question, faculty 0 0 0 0 0 appear to be eenuinely interested in helpine me. 
38. The faculty appears to regard their teaching responsibilities 0 0 0 0 0 
as a burden. 
The following statements describe some concerns that psychologists-in-training may 
. d . linial expenence unngc c supervision. 
Rate the degree to which each concern was an issue for you by 
darkening the appropriate circle. Consider the ONE 
CLINICAL SUPERVISION experience that had the greatest 
impact, either positive or negative, on your professional Q 
develonment. 
00 
~ -5 ~ ..c:: = 
Positive Negative - ~ ~ 39. Was this supervision experience: «S ~ - e Q Q ~ 0 0 z 00 
40. I was uncertain about what material to present to my 0 0 0 0 0 supervisor. 
41. I felt that my supervisor was incompetent or less 
competent than I. I often felt as if I was supervising 0 0 0 0 0 
him/her. 
42. I wanted to challenge the appropriateness of my 
supervisor's recommendations for using a technique with 0 0 0 0 0 
one of my clients, but I thought it better to keep my 
opinions to myself. 
43. I was not sure how best to use supervision as I became 0 0 0 0 0 more experienced. 
44. I believed that my supervisor's behavior in one or more 
situations was unethical or illegal & I was undecided 0 0 0 0 0 
about whether to confront him/her. 
45. My orientation to therapy was different from that of my 
supervisor. My supervisor wanted to work with clients 0 0 0 0 0 
using his/her framework & I felt that I should be allowed 
to use my own approach. 
46. I have wanted to intervene with one of my clients in a 
particular way & my supervisor has wanted me to 
approach the client in a very different way. I am expected 0 0 0 0 0 
to judge both what is appropriate for myself & also to do 
what I am told. 
47. My supervisor expected me to come prepared for 0 0 0 0 0 
supervision, but I had no idea how or what to prepare. 
48. I was not sure how autonomous I should be in my work 0 0 0 0 0 
with clients. 
109 
49. My supervisor told me to do something I perceived to be 0 0 0 0 0 ille2al or unethical & I was expected to comply. 
Q 
00 
Consider the ONE CLINICAL SUPERVISION experience that ..... .c 
~ 
~ (U = had the greatest impact, either positive or negative, on your .c :a 
professional development 
";J t ..... 
¢ e "" Q > z 00 
50. My supervisor's criteria for evaluating my work were not 0 0 0 0 0 specific. 
51. I was not sure that I had done what the supervisor 0 0 0 0 0 expected me to do in a session with a client. 
52. The criteria for evaluating my performance in 0 0 0 0 0 supervision were not clear. 
53. I got mixed signals from my supervisor & I was unsure of 0 0 0 0 0 which shmals to attend to. 
54. When using a new technique, I was unclear about the 
specific steps involved. Consequently, I was uncertain 0 0 0 0 0 
how my supervisor would evaluate my work. 
55. I disagreed with my supervisor about how to introduce a 
specific issue to a client, but I also wanted to do what the 0 0 0 0 0 
supervisor recommended. 
56. Part of me wanted to rely on my own instincts with 
clients, but I always knew that my supervisor would have 0 0 0 0 0 
the last word. 
57. The feedback I got from my supervisor did not help me to 
know what was expected of me in my day-to-day work 0 0 0 0 0 
with clients. 
58. I was not comfortable using a technique recommended by 
my supervisor; however, I felt that I should do what my 0 0 0 0 0 
supervisor recommended. 
59. Everything was new & I was not sure what would be 0 0 0 0 0 expected of me. 
60. I was not sure if I should discuss my professional 
weaknesses in supervision because I was not sure how 0 0 0 0 0 
they would be evaluated. 
61. I disagreed with my supervisor about implementing a 
specific technique, but I also wanted to do what the 0 0 0 0 0 
supervisor thou2ht best. 
62. My supervisor gave me no feedback & I felt lost. 0 0 0 0 0 
63. My supervisor told me what to do with a client, but did 0 0 0 0 0 not 2ive me very specific ideas about how to do it. 
64. My supervisor wanted me to pursue an assessment 
technique that I considered inappropriate for a particular 0 0 0 0 0 
client. 
65. There were no clear guidelines for my behavior in 0 0 0 0 0 supervision. 
66. The supervisor gave no constructive or negative feedback 
& consequently, I did not know how to address my 0 0 0 0 0 
weaknesses. 
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67. I did not know how I was doing as a therapist &, 
consequently, I did not know how my supervisor would 0 0 0 0 0 
evaluate me. 
68. I was unsure of what to expect from my supervisor. 0 0 0 0 0 
69. How long ago did you receive this supervision? 
70. How long did this supervision experience last? 
71. In total, how many months or years of clinical supervision 
have you had in your clinical trainin2 experience? 
72. In total, how many supervisors, including this one, have you 
had in your clinical trainin2 experience? 
73. How old are you? 
74. Please indicate your gender: 
Male Female 
0 0 
Thank you so much for your involvement Don't forget to fill out the enclosed 
postcard for your chance to be entered in the raffle to win one of two, $50.00 Gift 
Certificates for Amazon.com. To ensure anonymity, please return the postcard 
separately from the survey materials. 
H you would like to make any additional comments please do so below or include a 
separate sheet. 
Appendix D: Raffie Entry Postcard 
Thank you for participating in this research project. For your participation, you may 
enter a raffie for a chance to win one of two $50.00 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com. 
To enter, just fill in an email address or telephone number where we may contact you if 
you are one of the raffle winners. Take a couple of seconds now and send in for your 
chance to win!!! 
Where may we contact you if you are a raffle winner?------------
Thank you! 
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A. 
Psychology Graduate Student 
Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
p.s. remember to return the raffle entry postcard and the survey materials separately, and do not 
write your name on either the raffle entry postcard or the survey materials. 
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Dear (insert name) 
Approximately two weeks ago you received a copy of the Decision-Making Survey. We would 
like to take this opportunity to thank.you for participating in this research project. If you have not 
already done so, please take the time now to complete the survey and return it to us. Remember 
to also return separately, the raffle postcard to enter for your chance to win one of two $50.00 
Gift Certificates for Amazon.com. If you need to have another survey sent to you, please do not 
hesitate to contact us; mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu, (909) 558-8165. 
Thank you! 
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A. 
Psychology Graduate Student 
Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
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